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ABSTRACT 
Lying is so common in human behavior that some have labeled it a social skill. 
Despite the ubiquity of lies, humans have consistently been found to be poor lie detectors. 
Attempts have been made to improve the accuracy of human lie detection. Unfortunately, 
the most successful training only improves accuracy slightly above the level of chance. 
Because of its importance to society, considerable effort has been aimed at developing 
methods to help determine when people are lying. Researching how and why humans 
infer that another person is lying has the potential to advance the understanding of lie 
detection. Researchers have found that gender influences subjective judgments of 
trustworthiness and credibility. Further, gender may also influence behaviors resulting 
from these judgments. In other words, gender is likely to influence the tendency to infer 
lies. The goal of this study was to determine if differences exist in the likelihood of 
inferences that lies are being told due to the sex of the sender of the lies, the target of the 
lies, and a third-person evaluator of the lies. It was hypothesized that targets (individuals 
receiving a message) and third person evaluators would infer lies more often when the 
potential liar was of the opposite sex of the target than when the potential liar was the 
same sex as the target. Male participants would infer lies more often than female 
participants in all conditions except when non-verbal cues are unavailable. A scale of 
femininity would be negatively related to the number of lie inferences. Finally, it was 
thought that lies would be inferred less often when liars are female than when they are 
male. The results did not confirm any of the hypotheses. One surprising finding was that, 
iii 
iv 
as targets, participants inferred more lies when liars were female. Though the hypotheses 
were not confirmed, the results are nonetheless important for future research into factors 
affecting the inference of lies. Such factors have the potential to improve therapy 
services, marketing, and various aspects of interactions with the legal system. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Paul Ekman (2001) defines lying as "when one person intends to mislead another, 
doing so deliberately, without prior notification of the purpose, and without having been 
explicitly asked to do so by the target" (p. 28). Ekman goes on to identify several 
potential motives for lies, the most frequent of which is to avoid punishment. A 
non-exhaustive list of other motives to lie includes the protection of the self or others, to 
gain a reward, to win admiration, to avoid embarrassment, and to exercise power 
(Ekman, 2001). 
Lying is so common as a social behavior that it has been called it a "skill" 
(DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996). Like other social skills, children 
begin learning how to deceive early in their lives and hone their abilities through practice 
and social learning (Polak & Harris, 1999). In fact, Mitchell and Anderson (1997) believe 
that deceptive behaviors predate the human race. Investigators have observed simple 
deceptions among the behaviors of non-human primates. 
Lying benefits liars, but carries a high cost to society. So great is this cost that 
many techniques for lie detection have been developed in an effort to combat deception's 
negative impact. "Lie detectors" offer a range in accuracy and complexity. Polygraphs, 
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among the most well-known lie detection techniques, measure physiological arousal in 
order to detect lies. Some polygraph questioning techniques have indeed produced high 
accuracy rates (Bradley, et al.; Forman & McCauly, 1986; lacono & Lykken 1997). Other 
methods, involving the use of statement transcript analysis, brain imaging, and cognitive 
cue detection, have also shown promise for development into reliable lie detectors 
(Pezdek, Morrow, Blandon-Gilton, Quas, et al., 2004). Unfortunately, each of these 
techniques is limited. For example, the polygraph is vulnerable to countermeasures that 
alter the very physiological responses that distinguish lies from truthful responses 
(Bradley, MacLaren & Carle, 1996; Forman & McCauly, 1986; lacono & Lykken 1997). 
Transcript analysis, brain imaging, and cognitive cue detection are limited by several 
factors including utility across diverse samples, cost, and/or the need for further 
validation research (Pezdek et al., 2004; Spence, Hunter, Farrow, Green, Leung, et al., 
2004; Walczyk, Mahoney, Doverspike, & Griffith-Ross, 2009). 
In everyday life, circumstances often require humans to detect lies. Because lying 
is a ubiquitous part of human interaction, people confront situations frequently when the 
ability to detect deception would serve them well. Unfortunately, people are much more 
adept at lying than detecting lies (Bond & DePaulo, 2008). People are often placed in 
professional situations in which their ability to detect lies is crucial to their job 
performance. Law enforcement agents, legal personnel, human relations staff, and health 
care staff are among many professionals who are often required to determine the truth of 
others' statements. 
Psychologists are also called upon to detect lies. In psychological evaluation and 
treatment, actuarial assessments are used to detect malingering, a type of lying involving 
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the feigning of symptoms for personal gain (Pope, Butcher, & Seelen, 2006). For other 
deception such as non-disclosure in therapy or supervision of trainees, psychologists must 
rely on the same cues as laypersons to detect deception. In other words, without help 
from lie detection technology, psychologists, like other human beings, may simply be 
guessing at whether or not lies are occurring (Bond & DePaulo, 2008). 
Many cues to deception have been identified that improve the accuracy of 
people's efforts to detect lies (DePaulo, Epstein, & Wyer 1993). Behavioral cues include 
non-verbal and verbal actions that help humans to distinguish lies from truthful 
statements. In fact, interventions have been developed to train people to use these cues to 
improve their lie detection accuracy. However, the greatest estimates of accuracy, even 
with the best training, are only slightly above the level of chance (Bond & DePaulo, 
2008). 
Because of the poor performance of human lie detectors, Banikiotes and Merluzzi 
(1981) and Dacy and Brodsky (1992) examined factors that might create a bias in how 
the truthfulness of statements is inferred. Gender is among the factors that might bias 
people's lie detection attempts through influencing judgments of credibility and 
trustworthiness. (Banikiotes & Merluzzi, 1981; Dacy & Brodsky, 1992). DePaulo, Stone, 
and Lassiter (1985) have further noted that gender differences affect the ability to detect 
non-verbal cues relevant to deception detection. These findings suggest that gender has 
an impact on the frequency with which people infer that deception is taking place. The 
goal of this study was to determine how the tendency to infer lies might be influenced by 
biological gender and gender-related personality attributes. 
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Statement of the Problem 
Efforts to detect lies are as old as the human race itself (Mitchell & Anderson, 
1997). Still, human beings' ability to lie well surpasses their skills in lie detection. In fact, 
untrained humans are only accurate at slightly above the level of chance (Bond & 
DePaulo, 2008). With the goal of improving human lie detection, non-verbal cues that are 
generally related to lying have been identified (DePaulo, Lindsay, Malone, Muhlenbruck, 
Charlton, & Cooper, 2003). The most effective training programs have only increased 
accuracy to slightly above the level of chance, approximately 64%, where a hit rate of 50 
% is expected by chance (Bond & DePaulo). This suggests that other factors unrelated to 
deception influence the inference that a lie is occurring (DePaulo, Stone, & Lassiter, 
1985), perhaps gender. 
Judgments of credibility and trustworthiness are influenced by gender (Banikiotes 
& Merluzzi, 1981; Dacy & Brodsky, 1992). These constructs are theorized to influence 
how people interpret "possibly deceptive" statements. If credibility and trustworthiness 
influence the frequency of inferences of lies, it is possible that gender plays a role in 
these inferences, as well. This study explored the hypothesis that gender and gender-
related personality attributions influence the frequency with which lies are inferred. There 
are three key roles that are commonly involved in the evaluation of potential lies. The 
potential liar, commonly called the sender, the recipient of lies, or target, and a third-
person evaluator, or someone who observes the potential lie, but is not actually the 
recipient. It is possible that the gender(s) of any of these parties involved might influence 
whether lies are inferred. 
Evidence suggests that gender influences many aspects of lie detection, such as 
the interpretation of non-verbal behaviors. Rosenthal and DePaulo (1979) discovered that 
women were more accurate at interpreting non-verbal cues. In situations with higher 
"stakes," women lost their advantage such as when liars attempted to control their non­
verbal behaviors. Women were more likely to interpret statements as being truthful than 
were men, even when there was high motivation for the sender to lie (DePaulo, Epstein, 
& Wyer, 1993). The goal of the present study was to investigate factors other than "cue 
behaviors" that may bias lie inferences and, consequently, influence the accuracy of lie 
detection. 
DePaulo, Stone, and Lassiter (1985) investigated the effects of gender on the 
accuracy of lie detection. Targets were more accurate at detecting lies told by women. Lie 
detection was also more accurate when targets and potential liars were of the opposite 
sex. Even though the gender of the target and the potential liar influence the accuracy of 
human lie detection, it is not clear what specific behaviors account for the differences. In 
other words, research efforts have not addressed why lies are more "detectable" in 
women and by opposite sex senders. This study tested the hypothesis that the frequency 
of lie inferences is influenced by gender and gender-related personality attributes. 
Justification 
Human beings have consistently been found to be poor at deception detection. 
Research is needed on what factors irrelevant to deception nonetheless influence 
inferences of lies. This situation is made more urgent by the fact that attempts to create 
reliable technologies to detect lies have not been very successful, though several hold 
promise for further development (Kozel, Padgett, & George, 2004; National Research 
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Council, 2003; Walczyk, Mahoney, Doverspike, & Griffith-Ross; 2009). Gender is likely 
an important factor that influences people to infer lies (Banikiotes & Merluzzi, 1981; 
Dacy & Brodsky, 1992). 
People make judgments of trustworthiness quickly, based on appearance alone 
(Banikiotes & Merluzzi, 1981; Dacy & Brodsky, 1992; Porter, England, Juodis, Brinke, 
& Wilson, 2008). Like other decisions that are made with small amounts of information, 
trustworthiness judgments are resistant to change once they have been made (Carlson, 
1990). Moreover, people are poor at distinguishing truly trustworthy individuals from 
those who are untrustworthy (Porter et al., 2008). It seems that people inaccurately use 
biases in judgments that will likely influence their behavior. One aim of the present study 
was to identify factors that could bias judgments of trustworthiness, as well as understand 
how such factors influence the inference of lies. 
Research on the construct "credibility" also provides an impetus for the present 
study. Credibility judgments are defined as an estimate of the ability of someone to 
influence others (Hoyt, 1996). Trustworthiness is a component of credibility (Dacy & 
Brodsky, 1992). Gender has been included among factors that influence judgments of 
credibility (Banikiotes & Merluzzi, 1981; Dacy & Brodsky, 1992; Hoyt, 1996). Females 
are found to be more trustworthy and credible than males (Dacy & Brodsky). It is logical 
to infer that when someone is judged to be lower on credibility or trustworthiness, lies 
will be inferred more often in that person. If the same factors that influence these 
judgments also affect how people infer lies, then gender may play a role in lie inference, 
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as well. For example, if person A, a female, were rated as "highly credible", but person 
B, a male, were rated as "not credible", one would expect people to infer that person B 
lies more often than person A. 
Gender affects the ability to detect lies and succeed at lying. Women are usually 
more accurate at interpreting non-verbal cues than men, but their advantage diminishes in 
the "high stakes" situations in which lies are more common (Rosenthal & DePaulo, 
1979). DePaulo, Epstein, and Wyer (1993) suggest that women are more likely to 
interpret statements positively, or truthfully, than men. This was true even when there 
was high motivation for the sender to lie. In effect, women are more likely to give the 
sender the "benefit of the doubt". Others have shown that people are more accurate at 
detecting lies in members of the opposite sex (DePaulo, Stone, & Lassiter, 1985). This 
evidence supports the hypothesis that gender, indeed, plays a role in the accuracy of 
human lie detection. 
Considering gender's effects on lie detection accuracy (Rosenthal & DePaulo, 
1979) along with the evidence that females are typically given higher ratings of 
credibility and trustworthiness (Dacy & Brodsky, 1992), it is proposed that gender would 
influence inferences of lies. Therefore, this study explored how biological gender and 
gender-related attribution style of potential targets of lies and third-person evaluators 
affected lie inferences. The gender of potential liars was also examined as a possible 
influence on the frequency with which lies are inferred. These findings may advance 
understanding of how people form biases that lead to poor lie detection accuracy. 
8 
Literature Review 
Lying in Human Development 
Given lying's status as a social skill, it is important to first understand how 
prevalent the behavior is in human interaction. Most people lie daily (DePaulo, Kashy, 
Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996). In an effort to investigate the commonality of lying, 
DePaulo et al. (1996) asked participants to complete a journal including detailed accounts 
of daily social interactions in which they lied. The participants admitted to lies an average 
of three times each day. Additionally, lying emerges at an early age, as do many other 
common social behaviors. Most children engage in "deception-like" behaviors before age 
two. For example, a child who knows his or her own name may respond "daddy" when 
asked. These behaviors do not seem to be driven by the same influences that motivate 
lying in later stages of human development. At approximately age three, children begin 
telling lies for many of the same reasons as adults, including avoiding punishment or 
gaining reward (Ruffman, Olson, Ash, & Keenan, 1993). 
Although young children understand the concept and purpose of deception, 
proficiency and sophistication at lying comes with age and experience (Ruffman et al., 
1993). Toddlers' lies are usually not as complex as those of adults. But, at age three 
children are often able to prevent another person from obtaining an object by deception 
(Ruffman et al., 1993). And even though young children are generally poor liars, they lie 
with about the same frequency as older children who are more successful in their efforts. 
Lewis, Stranger, and Sullivan (1989) found that three-year-olds would lie when they had 
been asked not to peek at a toy after an experimenter left the room; 38 % of the children 
lied. The same percentage told the truth. The remaining 24 % of the children did not 
peek. The authors posit that children's lies are less effective because they do not take into 
account that the target may not share their point of view. They may be limited by their 
underdeveloped "theory of mind", that is their ability to accurately infer the mental states 
of others (Lewis, Stranger, & Sullivan). These findings imply that lying develops from a 
relatively primitive and ineffective behavior into a highly useful skill in adulthood. 
Because of the prevalence of simple lies that are told by children, Mitchell and 
Anderson (1997) believe that the ability to successfully deceive was selected through 
evolutionary processes. Studies of animals have provided evidence that deception may 
have an older evolutionary history than the human species. Non-human primates plan 
simple deceptive behaviors, such as pointing in order to misdirect another away from 
food (Mitchell & Anderson). Primates use deception to manage relationships, form 
alliances, and attain higher social rank. The evolutionary goal is to ensure one's genetic 
legacy (Adenzato & Ardito, 1999). The authors speculate that these are some of the same 
factors that influence lying in human adults. Primates' ability to plan and execute 
deceptive behaviors suggests that they are capable of thought processes sophisticated 
enough to evaluate social rules, abilities, and consequences (Adenzato & Ardito). Due to 
the presence of deceptive behaviors in non-human primates, it is probable that humans 
have "always" used deception (Mitchell & Anderson). 
Human Lie Detectors 
Given the history of deception in human society and its potential costs (DePaulo 
et al., 2003), efforts have been made to detect potentially detrimental deception. Human 
beings are often called upon to serve as detectors. In fact, lie detection is a common 
element of many human occupations (Bond, Omar, Pitre, Lashley, Skaggs, et al., 1992). 
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Individuals in certain professions are better at detecting lies than others. For instance, 
Secret Service agents are the most effective at lie detection. Federal officers, other law 
enforcement personnel, and clinical psychologists, who are specifically trained in lie 
detection, are more accurate in detecting lies than individuals in other professions (Bond 
et al. 1992). 
Attempts to detect lies are often based on the non-verbal behaviors of potential 
liars (Bond et al., 1992). In fact, several "cues" have been commonly associated with 
lying. Gaze aversion is a classic example of a stereotypical "symptom" of dishonesty. A 
person averts his or her gaze by breaking eye contact, or simply looking away from the 
target. Lie inferences commonly follow such cues. Bond et al. speculated that when the 
norms for non-verbal behavior are violated, it becomes more likely that lies will be 
inferred. They hoped to find predictable cues that could be used for lie detection (Bond et 
al.). 
To investigate their theory of expectancy violation, Bond et al. (1992) conducted 
a study in which three diverse groups were videotaped exhibiting "weird" behaviors as 
they truthfully described their feelings about people they knew. The weird behaviors 
included eye closure, unusual staring, arm raising, and shoulder raising, but not more 
conventional cues used to detect lies. The videos were later shown, without sound, to 
peers who were asked to judge if the individuals in the videos were telling the truth or 
lying. Individuals were likely to infer deception from any strange behavior. This study 
was replicated with a group of illiterate citizens of India as participants. The authors 
found similar results suggesting that the expectancy-violation model applies cross-
11 
culturally. The findings illustrate one of the reasons that people struggle to detect lies. 
People often misperceive any unexpected non-verbal behavior as a cue to deception 
(Bond et al.). 
Cues to Deception 
Efforts have been made to identify cues that humans can use to accurately detect 
lies. Frank and Ekman (2004) discovered cues in several behaviors that could be used to 
improve human efforts to detect lies. Cognitive cues include pauses, changes in rate of 
speech, and errors in speech. These cues are theorized to occur because of the cognitive 
load or effort that lying is thought to require compared to truth telling. Other cues may be 
driven by emotions such as guilt and fear. Emotions that accompany lying are displayed 
in voice tone, facial expression, and body posture cues (Frank & Ekman). 
An influential meta-analysis of deception research identified 158 verbal and non­
verbal cues to deception (DePaulo et al., 2003). There are many reliable verbal cues that 
can be used for lie detection. For example, lies entail more words with negative 
connotation such as neither, nor, none, no, etc. Deceptive statements convey more 
negative emotion. When lying, people complain more than when they are telling the 
truth. Lies are also less likely to have logical structure, and more likely to convey 
ambivalence. Moreover, deceptive statements are "bereft of ordinary imperfections" that 
are usually present in truthful statements (p. 104). An example of an imperfection in 
truthful statements would be a spontaneous correction to an erroneous comment or fact of 
the story (DePaulo et al.). The lack of imperfections may be due to a liar's attempt to 
make a story as believable as possible. Also, truth tellers are likely to describe elements 
of the setting of their stories while liars are more likely to describe peripheral 
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relationships or events, which include characters' relationships to one another (DePaulo 
et al.). Although, verbal cues are potentially useful to humans for detecting deception, 
many must be taken in the context of long statements. Consequently, they are more useful 
when completed statements are analyzed as a whole and compared to truthful accounts. 
Behavioral non-verbal cues to deception include pupil dilation, voice pitch 
fluctuations, and appearance, among others. These are useful for quick identification of 
lies. Other non-verbal cues can be used in lie detection. For example, liars look "less 
friendly" and have "less pleasant faces" than do truth tellers. Signs of tension (posture 
shifts, change in blinking rate, gaze aversion, silent pauses, and sneers) are not reliable 
cues; only general fidgeting is an effective cue (DePaulo et al., 2003). Trainers of human 
lie detectors have used this information to improve the accuracy of their trainees. Recall, 
however, that they have only been able to increase the accuracy the "best-trained" 
students to approximately 64% (Bond & DePaulo, 2008). 
Gender's Role in Lie Detection 
The gender of the observer has been theorized to have a role in how cues to 
deception are interpreted. There is evidence that women are more adept than men at 
identifying and interpreting non-verbal behaviors (Rosenthal & DePaulo, 1979). Despite 
their evident superiority, women lose their advantage specifically when trying to detect 
deception. Rosenthal and DePaulo conducted several experiments to compare men and 
women in their skills at detecting non-verbal cues. They found that women notice non­
verbal behaviors more than men, and are more accurate in interpreting them. The authors 
proposed that non-verbal cues are briefer when the sender attempts to control them, as is 
often the case during lying. As the duration of cues decreased, women were less likely to 
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interpret the cues negatively, and were likely to infer lies (Rosenthal & DePaulo). 
Women seemed to have given senders the benefit of a doubt by not interpreting 
ambiguous behaviors as deceptive. 
Rosenthal and Depaulo (1979) went on to explore several potential reasons for the 
pattern of women's lie detection performance. They proposed that certain types of cue 
channels, such as excessive body movement, are "leaky" because they are difficult to 
control (Rosenthal & DePaulo). To test their hypothesis, five measures of non-verbal cue 
sensitivity were derived from the Profile of Nonverbal Sensitivity (PONS), a measure 
designed to assess sensitivity to facial expression, body movements, and voice tone based 
on high-speed (250 ms) exposure to such cues and discrepancies between tone of voice 
and either facial expressions or body movements. It was proposed that women would be 
less likely than men to notice cues from the leaky channels. 
The results confirmed that females lost their advantage over men in reading 
non-verbal behavior, while attempting to interpret cues that are difficult for liars to 
control. The authors proposed that women attended to behaviors that were more easily 
controlled, whereas men attended to the "leakier" channels of non-verbal behavior. 
Discrepancies between the abilities of men and women to detect cues were accentuated 
when lying was likely, such as when cues were shorter, or motivation to lie high 
(Rosenthal & DePaulo, 1979). 
In another experiment, Rosenthal and DePaulo (1979) tested the hypothesis that 
women would be more "accommodating" of deceptive, non-verbal behaviors. The 
researchers argued that it is likely that women are able to identify non-verbal cues from 
leaky channels, but that they are more likely to interpret them positively as truthful 
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(Rosenthal & DePaulo). To test their hypotheses, stimuli were created by videotaping 20 
men and 20 women as they described someone they liked, someone they disliked, and 
someone they felt indifferently towards. In one condition, participants described the 
people they disliked as though they liked them and the people they liked as though they 
disliked them, that is, deceptively. In the other condition, the participants gave truthful 
descriptions. In a follow-up study, participants acted as lie detectors by indicating 
whether they believed the statements in the videos to be truthful or deceptive. Women 
interpreted deceptive cues incorrectly more frequently than men. Consequently, women 
were less accurate lie detectors. The authors speculate that women are socialized to be 
more accommodating than men. They go on to suggest that this is consistent with 
feminine social roles in western society (Rosenthal & DePaulo). 
DePaulo et al. (1993) also found evidence that women are more accommodating 
in their interpretations of ambiguous cues than men (Rosenthal & Depaulo, 1979). 
Realistic lying situations were the stimuli for this study, rather than attempting to isolate 
non-verbal cues. Participants observed an audio/visual stimulus of a recorded interaction 
between confederates and unsuspecting volunteers. To create the stimulus materials for 
this study, several volunteers were given the opportunity to choose four paintings from an 
art gallery. Two of the paintings were to be those that they liked most, and the other two 
were to be the two they liked the least. Next, they were introduced to a confederate whom 
they believed to be an art student. They were then asked to discuss their choices. The 
confederate was not made aware of the volunteers' painting preferences. Regardless of 
the choices, the confederate indicated that two of the chosen paintings were her own. One 
group was given no instruction on how to interact with the art student/confederate. The 
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other group was told to be polite. The final group was told to be honest, because doing so 
would help the art student improve. Participants later viewed the videos as lie detectors, 
and judged statements in the video presentations as truths or lies (DePaulo et al., 1993). 
Female "lie detector" participants interpreted statements in a positive light more 
frequently than male participants. This was true even when the motivation to lie or 
exaggerate feelings was high; such as when individuals in the video described the 
artist/confederate's own paintings. Females assumed more often than males that the 
potential liar was telling the truth and not exaggerating. DePaulo et al. (1993) noted that 
when individuals in the videos were accurately describing paintings they liked, females 
were significantly more accurate than males at realizing how much the speaker actually 
liked the paintings. Thus, women are not blind to people's feelings when they are telling 
the truth (DePaulo et al., 1993). Authors speculated that these findings were also a 
consequence of women's socialized tendency to assume honesty in others. The overall 
implication is that women are less likely than men to infer deception. 
Other gender-related factors affect the detectability of deception. DePaulo, Stone, 
and Lassiter (1985) examined how motivation to conform affects the detectability of lies. 
It was proposed that that senders speaking to opposite-sex targets would be more highly 
motivated to be successful at deceiving than senders speaking to same-sex targets. 
Authors believed that the attractiveness of the target would also be positively correlated 
with the sender's motivation lie successfully. Finally, they believed that senders would be 
more highly motivated to successfully deceive when feigning agreement rather than 
disagreement (DePaulo et al., 1985). To test these hypotheses, participants were given a 
list of topics to be discussed, along with the position that they were to defend in the 
16 
discussion, often opposite of their own. They were also provided with a photograph of the 
person with whom they would be discussing the topics and told that the individual in the 
photo was on the other side of a one-way mirror. The individuals in the photos varied in 
attractiveness. Actually, senders' discussions were videotaped. Another group of 
participants subsequently assessed the stimuli under one of four conditions. Some of the 
participants watched the audio/visual recording. In another condition, they listened to the 
audio only. Another group watched the video recording with no sound. The final group 
read verbatim transcriptions of the dialogue (DePaulo et al., 1985). 
The hypotheses were confirmed. As motivation to succeed at lying increased, the 
ability of others to accurately detect deception also increased. Lies told to a member of 
the opposite sex were more detectable than those told to a member of the same sex. When 
the targets were more attractive, senders were given lower sincerity ratings than senders 
who addressed unattractive targets. Recall that the "targets" of lies in this study were 
photographs of individuals with whom the senders believed they were addressing. The 
investigators posited the motivation to make a positive impression on more attractive 
targets caused an increase in the detectability of lies (DePaulo et al., 1985). Interestingly, 
sincerity ratings were low, regardless of whether the sender was telling the truth or lying, 
an indication of a possible bias that observers tend to be skeptical. 
DePaulo et al. (1985) went on to explore whether elements of the interaction 
influenced the detectability of lies. They found that lies involving feigned agreement 
were more detectable than feigned disagreement, most frequently when the target was 
more attractive. The authors speculated that attractive people are probably the targets of 
lies, particularly feigned agreement, more often than unattractive people. It was inferred 
17 
that senders are more likely to agree with attractive targets to make a good impression 
(DePaulo et al.). Similar results occurred when the participants were exposed to 
transcripts of the audio data. However, exposure to audio-only stimuli did not yield 
significant results (DePaulo et al.), probably because different criteria for attractiveness 
are applied to auditory information. 
In summary, the identification of accurate cues to deception is important in 
clinical, forensic, therapeutic, and evaluative settings in psychology and other 
professions. Humans generally make poor lie detectors, even those receiving specialized 
training. Misleading cues such as gender may influence the inference of lies. Research on 
the influences of gender on the inference of lies in senders might have important clinical 
significance for psychologists. It would be beneficial in psychological practice and in 
other fields to understand the biases that influence inferences of deception. These factors 
were tested in the current study and have implications for the therapeutic environment, 
for instance, is deception more likely to be inferred in a client simply because he is male? 
Trustworthiness 
A trustworthiness judgment can be defined as an evaluation that another person is 
likely to be a threat (Porter, England, Juodis, ten Brinke, & Wilson, 2008). Judgments of 
trustworthiness are often made based on a first impression Porter et al. (2008) 
hypothesized that judgments of trustworthiness are made quickly and confidence in these 
judgments increases over time. 
To evaluate the accuracy and stability of trustworthiness judgments, Porter and 
colleagues (2008) compiled photos of Nobel Peace Prize winners, Order of Canada 
winners, and pictures of individuals among America's Most Wanted criminals. 
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Participants were asked to rate each picture on a scale of trustworthiness. Theoretically, 
criminals' faces should have been labeled "untrustworthy", whereas the faces of the 
Nobel Peace Prize winners and Order of Canada winners should have been rated as 
"trustworthy" (Porter et al., 2008). 
Participants were correct more often in identifying trustworthy faces (Nobel Peace 
Prize and Order of Canada winners) than they were in identifying untrustworthy faces 
(criminals). This suggests that people are more likely to judge an untrustworthy person as 
trustworthy than the opposite. The assessments of trustworthy faces were still fairly 
inaccurate, 56 % correct, slightly above chance. Untrustworthy faces were assessed 
correctly only 48.8 % of the time, at the level of chance (Porter et al., 2008). 
At the time they made their initial judgments, participants were also asked to rate 
confidence in their judgments. Later, they were allowed to study the pictures for longer 
intervals after which they again rated their confidence in their original judgments. 
Confidence in the initial judgment remained stable, despite longer exposure to the 
pictures, suggesting that an initial assessment persists. The essence of these findings is 
that people can make judgments of trustworthiness based on appearance alone, and 
judgments tend to be inaccurate (Porter et al., 2008). Related to deception, immediate 
perception of a face as "trustworthy" may, decrease the accuracy of subsequent attempts 
to detect deception. Facial appearance is not, however, considered a reliable cue. 
Attributing trustworthiness based on appearance alone emphasizes the importance of 
understanding gender's influence on the assessment of trustworthiness, especially if 
judgments of trustworthiness are related to gender. 
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Judgments of trustworthiness affect the counseling environment as well. First-
impression judgments apply to counselors and clients and can have lasting effects on the 
therapeutic relationship. Similarly, judgments of credibility, akin to trustworthiness, also 
influence therapy (Dacy & Brodsky, 1992). 
Credibility in Therapeutic Settings 
Credibility judgments can be defined as evaluations of someone's skill at a 
particular task. Trustworthiness and "expertness", or the perception of the person's ability 
to perform, are components of credibility (Atkinson, Maruyama, & Matsui, 1978). In 
therapeutic settings, several factors can influence how the therapist is perceived (Dacy 
and Brodsky, 1992). To study this phenomenon, Dacy and Brodsky developed slides 
showing magazine photos of three men and three women modeling clothing categorized 
as informal, casual, and formal. Each gender was represented equally in each category. 
Participants were shown the slides and asked to rate each person pictured on eight 
credibility sub-factors. Formal attire was associated with significantly higher ratings on 
"skill centered items" including expertise, knowledge, credibility, and organization. 
Formal attire also correlated with higher ratings of trustworthiness, sympathy, 
attractiveness, and friendliness. Females received higher ratings of expertise, sympathy 
and trustworthiness than male therapists. The authors speculated that, among the 
stereotypical gender roles assigned to women, are that they are often assumed to be more 
nurturing and caring than men. Consequently, they have a "head start" when individuals 
judge their credibility (Dacy & Brodsky). 
Credibility studies have important implications for the study of deception. 
Because female therapists are generally rated higher in trustworthiness (Dacy & Brodsky, 
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1992), it can be hypothesized that lies will be inferred less in therapy settings when the 
therapist is female. Outside of therapy, these findings imply that lies may be inferred less 
when the sender is female. A gender bias, favoring females seems to exist (Dacy & 
Brodsky). The speculation that feminine gender roles are, at least in part, the cause of the 
gender disparity in trustworthiness ratings implies that the bias exists outside of the 
therapeutic setting as well. 
In summary, the research on credibility and trustworthiness add three important 
pillars to the theoretical foundation of the current study. First, people are largely 
inaccurate at judging trustworthiness based on a first impression (Porter et al., 2008). 
Second, the desire to avoid others' negative evaluations influences the ability to detect 
deception (DePaulo et al., 1985). Third, gender influences judgments of trustworthiness 
and credibility, especially those made in therapeutic settings (Dacy & Brodsky, 1992). If 
clients and therapists, as well as people in other professional or social environments, are 
made aware of the tendency to assess credibility based at least partly on gender, 
awareness of this misleading cue may help to overcome it. Thus, trustworthiness and 
credibility judgments as well as inferences of lies could be based more on cues that are 
more related to therapists' actual ability. 
Psychologists Detecting Deception 
Despite the large number of studies in the area of deception detection, holes exist 
in the literature. In their review, Bond and DePaulo (2008) found that, in general, people 
are no better at detecting deception than flipping a coin. The disparity between the 
frequency of lying and people's ability to detect lies underscores a need to increase 
understanding of the dynamics of lying, lie detection, and what causes individuals to infer 
21 
lies. Psychologists are among the professionals who must rely on their ability to detect 
deception. Moreover, psychologists are frequently called upon in litigation and in the 
human relations arena to ascertain the veracity of statements, stories, or testimony 
(Boccaccini & Brodsky, 2002). This is especially true in the assessment of malingering. 
Malingering 
Malingerers seek psychological services and other unwarranted benefits by 
feigning symptoms, that is, they fake illness. Psychologists typically use psychological 
assessments to detect malingering in clinical populations (Pope, Butcher, & Seelen, 
2006). Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (MMPI-2) profiles, for example, 
have long been used in forensic settings to assess malingering, based partly on the wealth 
of research data on the variety of ways that have been used to cheat the test (Pope et al.). 
In fact, several stereotypical MMPI-2 response patterns have been identified that are 
based on various motivations for malingering. Elevations on validity and clinical scales 
are often used to this end. For instance, the L scale is commonly referred to as the "lie 
scale". Items on this scale were designed to detect deliberate attempts to answer 
dishonestly. Specifically, L scale items identify underreporting of symptoms. Similar 
scales are designed from questions that were written to identify defensiveness, overly 
virtuous self-presentation, and inconsistent response patterns. The F and Fb scales can 
also be used to identify the feigning or exaggerating of mental health problems (Pope et 
al.). Other psychological tests have been designed specifically for the detection of 
malingering such as the Test of Memory Malingering (Tombaugh, 1996) and the 
Structured Interview of Reported Symptoms (SIRS) (Rogers, Bagby. & Dickens. 1992), 
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among others. In forensic settings, improving the detection of malingering would 
increase accountability of those seeking improper insanity or incompetency pleas (Pope 
et al.). 
In evaluation and treatment settings, other types of deception occur. Clients lie for 
various reasons (Heilveil & Muehleman 1981). Even when cases do involve malingering, 
expensive and time consuming psychological testing may not be feasible. Without the 
benefit of assessment tools, psychologists are left with the same skills as laypeople. 
Therefore, it would be advantageous for psychologists to understand if biases exist in the 
tendency to attribute lies, especially in cases in which relevant psychological tests do not 
exist. 
Credibility of Expert Witness Testimony 
Boccaccini and Brodsky (2002) found that several factors influence the perceived 
credibility of clinicians' expert testimony. In their survey of potential jurors, 37 % 
reported that they would be more likely to believe a psychologist expert witness from 
their local community, while 23 % would be more likely to believe someone from out of 
state. Other conditions that increased the perceived credibility of psychological testimony 
include the psychologist's primary role (therapist vs. expert witness) and his or her 
previous court experience, among several others. The results of this study underscore that 
assessments of credibility are multi-determined (Boccaccini & Brodsky, 2002). Gender 
was not one of the variables under consideration in this study, an oversight that was 
addressed by the present research. 
For psychologists in forensic settings, improving the understanding of deception, 
lie detection and credibility are vital (Rogers. Bagby. & Dickens. 1992). In legal 
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proceedings, life and death can literally hinge upon an expert's testimony, creating a 
great demand for accuracy in the assessment of truth or deception. For example, in cases 
of pleas of insanity and incompetence, psychologists are often called upon to evaluate 
defendants' sanity and competence to stand trial. Evaluations often influence trial 
outcomes and sentencing (Atkins v. Virginia, 2002). Injury trails, the credibility of the 
defendant, attorney, and experts all factor into the outcome of the trial. Understanding 
factors such as gender that might influence the inference of deception in others would 
benefit forensic psychology. 
Nondisclosure in Supervision 
Clinical supervisors could also benefit from a greater understanding of possible 
gender biases in their tendencies to infer lies. In a self-report of supervisee behaviors, 
Yorman and Farber (1996) discovered that it is common for therapists-in-training to 
consciously withhold clinical information from supervisors. Supervisees withhold 
information to avoid punishment or reprimand, and to portray themselves in the most 
favorable light. Neither experience nor age decreases the frequency of supervisees' 
nondisclosure (Yorman & Farber). Using video and audio recordings did not reduce the 
frequency of nondisclosure or distortion by supervisees (Wallace & Alonzo, 1994). 
Consequently, clinical supervisors are left with the burden of deciding if their supervisees 
are providing accurate information. If gender interactions significantly affect the 
inference of lies, supervisors and clinicians alike should be made aware to guard against 
gender bias in the inferences of lies 
In summary, many professionals, psychologists included must rely on their ability 
to ascertain the truth. However, evidence strongly suggests that human beings are poor lie 
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detectors (Bond & DePaulo, 2008). Though cues have been identified that could improve 
skills in lie detection, people are influenced by other factors including, but not limited to, 
preliminary judgments of credibility and trustworthiness based on appearance alone. Not 
only are these factors unreliable for use in lie detection, but also may create biases that 
can influence the inference of lies. As an alternative to human lie detectors, various 
technologies that minimize the role of humans in lie detection have been proposed. 
Lie Detection Techniques 
Polygraph Tests 
Technology has been developed over several decades to identify physiological 
responses that may occur with deception (Kircher & Raskin, 1998). The most common 
instrument used to detect deception is the polygraph test. Polygraphs measure the 
physiological responses of a person during a question-and-answer session. Theoretically, 
physiological responses during deception are different when compared to the measures of 
responses obtained when people are telling the truth. Variations may be due to the 
heightened anxiety that is thought to occur during deception. Examiners are tasked with 
comparing arousal responses caused by control test items (questions or choices) to those 
caused by relevant test items to which examinees might lie. Typically, output readings of 
heart rate, skin conductance, breathing rate, and blood pressure are used in polygraph 
examinations (Kircher & Raskin). 
Scoring criteria are applied to polygraph output to determine significant 
elevations in arousal that would indicate a possible deceptive response. There is some 
disagreement about what constitutes an elevated response (Honts, Raskin, & Kircher, 
1994; Horowitz, Kircher, Honts, & Raskin, 1997; Kircher & Raskin, 1988; Podlesny & 
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Raskin, 1978; Rovner, Raskin, & Kircher, 1979). A polygraph examiner can analyze data 
either by being present during testing or by subsequently reviewing hard copies of the 
data to draw conclusions. It is also possible for computer programs to be used to analyze 
polygraph data. Further, there are also several ways to conduct polygraph questioning. 
The most common administration technique is called the Control Question Test (CQT) 
(Barland & Raskin, 1975; Kircher & Raskin, 1988; National Research Council 2003). 
Control Question Test (CQT). The Control Question Test is a variant of 
polygraph questioning based on the assumption that lying causes elevations in several 
physiological indicators of arousal. Test administrators compare the feedback of 
instruments that measure heart rate, skin conductance, blood pressure, and other 
autonomic responses during control questioning to which the administrator knows the 
answers, with responses to questions that may yield lies. Control questions frequently 
include asking the test-taker to confirm his/her name, address, or social security number. 
The accuracy of the CQT has been long been debated (National Research 
Council, 2003). There is evidence that scoring methods for the CQT are generally biased 
against innocent people. Effectively, honest responses are scored as deceptive or 
inconclusive more frequently than lies are scored as inconclusive or as honest responses 
(National Research Council; Patrick & Iacono). Furthermore, test administrators often 
use "extra-polygraphic" data to influence their scoring, which can lower accuracy. This 
means that a number of factors beyond the polygraph output influence scoring, often 
resulting in the misinterpretation of inconclusive results as lies (National Research 
Council; Patrick & Iacono). Test administrators also have the ability to control the 
environment of the examinee. Environmental factors often influence levels of anxiety, 
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potentially invalidating polygraph results (National Research Council). In fact, the results 
of the CQT are rarely admissible in court because of validity concerns arising from these 
complications (National Research Council). 
Guilty Knowledge Test (GKT). Another variant of the polygraph exam, the 
Guilty Knowledge Test (GKT) (Lykken, 1959), measures responses to multiple-choice 
questions to which both the guilty person (perpetrator of a crime) and the examiner know 
the correct answer (e.g., "What kind of gun was used to shoot Mr. Doe? Was it a 357 
magnum.. .a sawed off shotgun... an AK-47... a Thompson automatic... or a .45 caliber 
Glock?") (MacLauren, 2001). The administrator must be certain that the correct choice is 
included among the foils. Knowing this, the examiner may see increased arousal when 
the correct choice is presented to a perpetrator (Lykken). In theory, an individual without 
incident-relevant knowledge will have the same physiological response to correct and 
incorrect answer choices, as they would be unaware of the correct choice (Lykken, 1959). 
The GKT uses control alternative choices in a multiple-choice format rather than 
control questions. The design of the GKT theoretically eliminates the necessity for the 
examinee to even provide an answer to a question. Sufficient arousal should be elicited 
by the perception of the correct answer alone, which would suggest that the examinee has 
intimate knowledge of the crime. Questions on the GKT can be asked multiple times to 
improve the accuracy of the conclusion reached. MacLauren (2001) notes that if a 
question is asked three times and has four alternatives (one guilty alternative and three 
neutral alternatives), the mathematical likelihood that a person without crime-relevant 
knowledge would show sufficient physiological response to the correct answer is/? = 
.0156. 
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The GKT has reportedly accurately detected "guilt" 80% of the time and 
"innocence" 90% of the time (Bradley, Mac Lauren, & Carle 1996). A more recent meta­
analysis of polygraph research estimates that the GKT is able to accurately detect lies 
between 76% and 83% of the time (MacLauren, 2001). It is frequently difficult, however, 
for an examiner to gain enough knowledge about a crime to develop proper questions 
and/or choices for the test to be widely used. This technique demands that the examiner 
knows specific details of the crime that are often unavailable to most without firsthand 
knowledge of the circumstances of the crime. Moreover, an innocent individual may have 
learned details of a crime that could make the results suggest guilt, thus producing a false 
positive finding (Forman & McCauley, 1986). 
Positive Control Test (PCT). A third form of polygraph questioning is called the 
Positive Control Test (PCT). In this protocol, the examinee is instructed to tell a lie in 
response to a yes or no question ("Tell me a lie, did you steal the exam from your 
professors office?) He/she is then instructed to tell the opposite. ("Now tell me the truth, 
did you steal the exam from your professor's office?). The test assumes that a guilty 
person will show evidence a significant response when he/she tells the truth, as telling the 
truth would incriminate a guilty person (Forman & McCauley, 1986). An innocent person 
should theoretically show greater arousal to telling a lie. It is proposed that lying 
naturally causes more arousal than truth telling. 
Forman and McCauley (1986) found that the PCT is accurate up to 78% of the 
time. Even better accuracy has been found when the test is paired with other polygraph 
questioning techniques. When the PCT was paired with the CQT, examiners using the 
combined format detected deception with 100 % accuracy. Despite favorable validity 
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estimates, insufficient research exists on the PCT compared to other polygraph 
techniques (Forman & McCauley, 1986). 
Each polygraph technique has been found to have some efficacy for detecting lies. 
Yet, rarely are the results of such tests admissible in legal settings. This is partly due to 
the development of well-known countermeasures that allow liars to beat the polygraph, 
thus undermining the validity of results. 
Countermeasures. Regardless of which technique is used, countermeasures can 
confound the results of a polygraph examination. Studies have shown that both the 
Controlled Question and Guilty Knowledge Tests are vulnerable to countermeasures 
(Honts, Hodes, & Ruskin, 1985). However, it is apparent that all variations of polygraph 
questioning can be undermined by the use of countermeasures. One common 
countermeasure involves self-inflicted pain during questioning. Pain heightens arousal. 
Simply biting the tongue or the inside of the cheek at appropriate times during 
questioning result in pain. If pain is caused during truthful answering, heightened arousal 
during lying will not stand out as deceptive. The use of this countermeasure is 
undetectable by the examiner and is well known by those who may be motivated to coach 
potential subjects of polygraph exams (Honts et al.; National Research Council, 2003). 
Muscle contraction has also been used as a polygraph countermeasure. This can 
be accomplished by pressing a toe against the inside front of a shoe while answering 
control questions. The idea behind this is that the physiological response caused by the 
contracting muscles results in output sufficiently similar to lying to confuse examiners. 
Using this countermeasure during both lying and truth telling confounds the comparisons 
(Honts et al., 1985). 
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Both of these countermeasures, as well as combinations of the two, have allowed 
examinees to beat the polygraph (Iacono & Lykken 1997). Combinations of the two are 
most effective. As evidenced by surveys done by Division 1 of the American 
Psychological Association, the Society for General Psychology, none of the currently 
used polygraph techniques are generally accepted (Iacono & Lykken). 
Criteria-Based Content Analysis 
Another technique for detecting lies is called Criteria-Based Content Analysis 
(CBCA). This method was developed in the 1950s and was originally designed to assess 
the credibility of verbatim transcripts of statements made by children alleging to be 
victims of sexual abuse (Pezdek et al., 2004). Examples of criteria include the following. 
Truthful statements will be logical and coherent (criterion 1) and a truthful person is more 
likely to doubt his/her memory of the events than a liar (criterion 15). As noted 
previously, CBCA uses 18 such criteria to determine the truth of a transcription resulting 
from a structured interview. Trained judges can use CBCA to distinguish between true 
and false statements in children with up to 86% accuracy. Though they are also 
significantly better than chance, CBCA results are not as applicable to the statements of 
adults (Pezdek et al.). Despite the promise that CBCA shows in distinguishing fabrication 
from truth, it is not used as frequently as polygraph tests. To further call into question 
CBCA's utility, the age of the child and the familiarity of an event can affect its accuracy 
in assessing children's statements (Pezdek et al.). 
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Brain Imaging 
Technologies for measuring neurological activities also hold promise as lie 
detection methods. Brain scanning techniques such as functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) are able to detect changes in neuronal metabolism due to activation in 
corresponding brain areas (Spence, Hunter, Farrow, Green, Leung, et al., 2004). There 
have been three seminal studies in the imaging of deception (i.e., Langleben Schroeder, 
Maldjian, Gur, McDonald, Ragland, et al., 2002; Lee, Liu, Tan, Chan, Mahankali, et al., 
2002; Spence et al., 2001). In each study, participants were asked to perform deceptive 
behaviors while being scanned in a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 
device. Researchers have tested the suggestion that two processes are involved in forming 
a deception: inhibition of truth and the formation of a lie. In other words, the brain must 
expend energy to inhibit telling the truth and then to create a lie (Spence et al.). Inhibition 
of the truth would, theoretically, activate regions of the ventral prefrontal cortex that are 
typically activated during the inhibition of other responses. Further, it was believed that 
lies would activate dorsolateral areas of the prefrontal cortex, which are implicated in 
novel response generation (Spence et al.). 
To test this theory, computerized protocols were administered to participants 
during an fMRI scan requiring them to answer yes or no to a series of questions by 
pressing a key that corresponded to each answer. Spence et al. (2001) found that areas of 
the bilateral, ventrolateral, prefrontal and anterior cingulated cortices, all of which are 
within the prefrontal region of the brain, evidenced activation during lying. The data 
supported the hypothesis that prefrontal areas are active during the generation of lies. It 
was concluded, however, that these activations were primarily associated with the 
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inhibition of truthful responding rather than with the generation of a "novel" lie. Areas 
associated with response generation were not activated. The researchers' prediction was 
not confirmed. Findings partially supported the original hypothesis, but it is possible that 
the yes or no answer pattern did not mandate that participants generate novel information 
in order to lie, only reverse the truthful response (Spence et al.). Langleben et al., (2002) 
noted the same activations when using GKT polygraph questioning techniques. 
Rather than identifying individual areas activated by lying, Lee et al. (2002) 
believed that unique neural "pathways" or activity patterns exist in the formation of 
deception. To test this hypothesis, investigators instructed participants to feign symptoms 
of memory loss while imagining that being successful in their deceit would result in a 
large cash award. The fMRI data indicated that prefrontal areas correlated with 
information manipulation and the control of executive functioning were active, along 
with a dorsolateral prefrontal region that has been implicated in performance anticipation 
and explicit memory retrieval (Lee et al.). Areas of the parietal and temporal lobe, as well 
as the subcortical caudate and posterior cingulate, were also active. These areas have 
been associated with calculated responding, visual imagery, and the inhibition of 
obedience to rules. In sum, these authors have made a strong case for the existence of 
neural pathways for deception. Unlike the other two studies, this situation was specific 
and involved rather complex deception. Further research may replicate the findings as 
well as identify similar neural activity patterns associated with all deceptive behavior 
(Lee et al.). 
Although imaging studies involving fMRI-scanning technology hold promise for 
the detection of deception, further investigation is warranted to understand the roles of 
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specific areas in lying behavior (Kozel, Padgett, & George, 2004). Further, consistent 
activation patterns have not been identified across individuals due to a variety of 
individual differences in physiology. Further research is needed to identify patterns that 
can be used for deception detection across individuals (Kozel et al.). These techniques are 
also presently cost-prohibitive and lying situations of the experiments lack ecological 
validity (Spence et al. 2002). Due to limited access and high cost, there is inadequate 
research on brain imaging for lie detection (Spence et al., 2001; Kozel et al.). As 
equipment improves, neuroscience advances, and operating costs are reduced, the fMRI 
brain imaging techniques may yield an effective way to detect deception, but that is years 
away (Kozel et al.). 
Cognitive Lie Detection 
Results of brain imaging studies have led to theories regarding the use of 
cognitive cues to deception. It is proposed that lying requires more cognitive effort than 
truth-telling (Vrij, Leal, Par, Mann, Fisher, Hillman et al., 2009; Vrij, Mann, Fisher, Leal, 
Milne, & Bull, 2008; Walczyk, Roper, Seeman, & Humphrey, 2003; Walczyk et al., 
2009; Walczyk, Schwartz, Clifton, Adams, Wei, & Zha, 2005). Along these lines, 
Walczyk et al. (2003) propose the Activation-Decision Construction Model (ADCM) of 
lying that posits three stages in the formation of a lie response. During the activation 
stage, a question activates the memories of the truth, from long-term memory. Once the 
truth is active in working memory, the decision stage follows. More cognitive energy is 
spent in the decision making process. Semantic and episodic memories of the truth are 
then utilized to anticipate the potential costs and benefits of truthfulness. If the costs are 
acceptable, the individual often decides to tell the truth. If they are too high, a decision to 
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lie will be made. The individual must then construct a lie. This begins the construction 
stage. Long-term memory is accessed again in order to construct a lie that is appropriate 
to the situation. (Walczyk et al., 2003; Walczyk et al., 2005; Walczyk et al., 2009). Based 
on this theory, liars take more time to answer, as lying requires the decision and 
construction stages whereas truth telling only involves truth activation. Furthermore, the 
authors posit that lying increases the frequency of inconsistent answers over truth telling 
because lies are less detailed than corresponding truths. 
To test these hypotheses, Walczyk and colleagues (2009) randomly assigned 
participants to one of two groups: truth-tellers and unrehearsed liars. Each group was 
instructed to answer a series of questions as quickly as possible. A computer program 
randomly presented questions that were read from a computer screen by an experimenter. 
Response times were measured from the last word of each question to when the 
participants answered each question. Several question pairs were checked to determine 
the logical consistency of participants' answers. Analyses revealed that liars had 
significantly longer response times (about 230ms) than truth-tellers. Lying was also 
shown to increase the frequency of inconsistencies (Walczyk et al.). 
Researchers went on to hypothesize that response time and inconsistencies would 
discriminate truth-tellers from both rehearsed and unrehearsed liars. To test this, a group 
of participants were given an opportunity to rehearse their lies prior to the experimental 
procedure. This group was given ten minutes to study the list of questions. They were 
instructed to lie to all questions. The same computer programs described above were used 
for the questioning and gathering of response time data. 
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Response time for rehearsed liars was still significantly longer than that of 
unrehearsed liars and truth-tellers, but shorter than rehearsed liars. Rehearsal lowers the 
cognitive load of lying, but not to the level of truth telling. These studies support the 
ADCM and the efficacy of cognitive approaches to lie detection. However, the authors 
note that lying is a cognitively complex task, and that cognitive lie detection techniques 
need much refinement (Walczyk et al.). 
Vrij et al. (2008) proposed that increasing cognitive load on liars could help 
human lie detectors to be more accurate. They speculated that, if the task of lying is more 
difficult, liars should display more signs of cognitive load than truth tellers. To test this 
theory, researchers engaged a group of participants in a situation in which they were 
falsely accused of a theft. Members of a second group of participants each committed a 
staged theft. They were given an alibi and told to lie when they were questioned about the 
money they had stolen. Both groups were later questioned under the pretense that they 
were suspected of taking money out of a wallet. Half of the participants in each group 
were instructed to simply recount the details of their experience naturally. The remaining 
participants were instructed to tell the interviewer the story in reverse chronological order 
in order to increase the cognitive load. The questioning sessions were videotaped and 
transcribed. Transcripts were coded for cues based on the details and cues exhibited by 
participants. Researchers hypothesized that each coded behavior is a sign of increased 
cognitive loading (Vrij et al.). 
They found that, in the reverse order condition, liars included less auditory 
information. In other words, they described sounds and conversation with less frequency 
than truth tellers and those who told stories in chronological order. Also, reverse-order 
35 
liars provided fewer details about the spatial aspects of events (where things were located 
or how things moved) and more details about their own thoughts and feelings. Reverse-
order liars hesitated more in their speech, spoke more slowly, and made more speech 
errors than truth tellers. Once again, each of these cues is believed to be a sign of 
increased cognitive load. Vrij et al. (2008) also observed more signs of anxiety including 
leg and foot movements, and increased blinking in reverse-order liars' behaviors. In the 
control condition (chronological order), liars moved hands and fingers significantly less 
than truth tellers. Apparently, liars were attempting to control the movements of their 
body. No other differences were identified between liars and truth tellers when stories 
were told in normal chronological order (Vrij et al.). 
Virj et al. (2008) tested a method of human lie detection based on cognitive cues. 
Participants in this study were all police officers who watched the videos from the 
experiment described above. Each officer watched 12 interviews. The participants in the 
videos had been asked to recount the story in reverse chronological order. After each 
video clip, officers were asked three questions: "Do you think the suspect is telling 
(truth/lie)?" "To what extent does the person in the video look as if he/she is having to 
think hard?" and "To what extent does the person in the video look nervous?" The final 
two questions were answered on a Likert-type rating scale. Officers who viewed clips of 
stories told in reverse order were significantly more accurate (60%) at detecting lies than 
those who watched the stories in chronological order (42%). The 60% accuracy is also 
better than chance for lie detection in general. Truth detection was slightly less accurate: 
56% for the reverse-order condition, and 50% in the chronological order control. Total 
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accuracy (truth and lie detection) was significantly higher for the reverse order condition 
(58%) than for the control condition (46%). Interestingly, the reverse order accuracy is 
better than chance, though the authors note that accuracy is not "high" (Vrij et al.). 
Another method of increasing cognitive load proposed by Walczyk et al. (2005) 
and later tested by Vrij et al. (2009) is to ask unanticipated questions. Doing so is 
theorized to increase the number of inconsistencies between allegedly corroborating 
stories. In order to test this theory, Vrij et al. created a situation in which one group of 
paired participants was accused of a theft. Each pair was actually elsewhere during the 
alleged commission of the crime; they had a true alibi. Another group was given a false 
alibi, but had actually committed the theft. During questioning, the participants were 
interviewed individually, that is, with the other member of their pair absent. The number 
of inconsistencies between stories was collected later. 
Analyses of the results showed that asking unanticipated questions enhances lie 
detection by increasing the number of inconsistencies between the answers of the 
members of each pair. As another surprise, one of the tasks was to have each participant 
independently draw the layout of his or her location during the crime. Inconsistencies 
between pairs' drawings allowed interviewers to detect truths with 80% accuracy and lies 
with 75% accuracy. Inconsistencies in other details also showed significant elevations 
among liars. The investigators assert that the unanticipated nature of the tasks and 
questions that were asked during the interview increased the number of inconsistencies 
between the pairs. These questions and tasks served a twofold purpose. First, 
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unanticipated elements in an interview eliminate some of the effects of preparation. The 
second purpose of the unanticipated elements is to increase the cognitive complexity of 
the interview and, thus, increase cues to deception (Vrij et al., 2009). 
Cognitive lie detection represents a prospective shift in human and technology 
based techniques for detecting lies. Investigators propose that lying is more cognitively 
complex than telling the truth and that increasing the cognitive effort required to lie by 
accessing the truth in novel ways serves to increase the accuracy of lie detection. This is 
an emerging and promising trend in the lie detection literature. 
Summary 
Lying is an important behavior in human society that develops with experience 
throughout the lifespan (DePaulo et al., 1996). As with other socialized behaviors, 
children learn to lie more effectively as they age (Ruffman et al., 1993). In fact, lying has 
enhanced survival in non-human social animals. Capuchin monkeys engage in simple 
deceptive behavior suggesting that evolutionary processes have selected lying due to its 
benefits for the species (Mitchel & Anderson, 1997). Despite the apparent social benefit 
of lying, deception can cause social problems in many situations by undermining or 
misinforming others, who then go on to make poor decisions. 
Lying is often reinforced in human society because, even with training, humans 
are largely unsuccessful at deception detection. Untrained human lie detectors are 
actually about as accurate as simply guessing (Bond & DePaulo, 2008). In an effort to 
reduce the cost related to lying, efforts have been made to improve human lie detection 
accuracy. Many techniques involve the identification of behavioral "cues" to deception. 
Over 158 verbal and non-verbal cues to deception have been identified (DePaulo et al., 
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2003). Unfortunately, people are generally not attuned to these cues. Moreover, some 
cues may be too subtle to be measured without the aid of technology. Individuals trained 
in lie detection are still only slightly above the level of chance accuracy (Bond et al., 
1992). 
People also struggle to detect lies because biases involved in lie inferences may 
exist. Studies by DePaulo et al. (1985), DePaulo et al. (2003), and Rosenthal and 
DePaulo (1979) have shown how characteristics of the various individuals in social 
interactions influence the "detectability" of lies. For example, women are more skilled at 
detecting and interpreting non-verbal cues. However they tend to overlook the same cues 
when deception is more probable and assume that others are being truthful. Social 
learning, theoretically, teaches women to perceive as more intensely unfavorable the 
consequences from inferring lies than men. Women may also wish to give senders the 
"benefit of a doubt." Consequently, women are often less accurate than men in detecting 
deception (Rosenthal & DePaulo,). 
Gender plays a role in the detectability of lies in other ways. Rosenthal and 
DePaulo (1979) found that in opposite sex target-sender dyads, the sender was more 
motivated to succeed at lying. If the sender "tries too hard" to cover lies, he/she provides 
more cues (Rosenthal & DePaulo). This finding is particularly relevant to the current 
study. The interaction between the gender of the sender and the gender of the target was 
evaluated in present research to determine if gender biases influences the frequency with 
which lies are inferred. 
In summary, multiple factors influence how people decide if someone is lying or 
telling the truth (Porter et al., 2008). Trustworthiness and credibility are two broad 
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constructs that are related to how people form inferences of deception (Dacy & Brodsky, 
1992; Porter et al.). Trustworthiness judgments are made based on an appearance-based 
"first impression'*. People are more accurate in judging trustworthy faces than 
untrustworthy ones. Enduring biases are likely to influence behaviors based on these 
unreliable judgments, namely inference of lies (Porter et al.). In therapeutic settings, 
formality of attire and gender influence judgments of credibility, which are commonly 
higher for female therapists (Dacy & Brodsky). 
Studies of credibility and trustworthiness suggest that gender may influence the 
inference of lies. The current study took the "next step" in assessing directly how gender 
of the sender, the target and the observer influence the inferences of lies. This is 
especially relevant to the field of psychology. Clinical psychologists' judgments of 
clients' truth or deception potentially have profound implications for their clients. 
Psychological testing improves the accuracy of detection, but is far from failsafe (Pope et 
al., 2006). Though many assessments can detect subtle forms of deception, testing is not 
always necessary (Pope et al.). Therefore, psychologists are often left to use the same, 
unreliable, methods for detecting deception as laypeople. 
To further summarize, the ubiquity of damaging lies has led many investigators to 
use technology as a mechanism for detecting lies. Polygraph-based techniques are 
examples of technological lie detectors that measure various indicators of physiological 
arousal. The device is based on the assumption that greater arousal results from deception 
than from truth telling. Several questioning techniques have been developed for use with 
the polygraph. Each format has yielded varying success rates and limitations to its utility 
(Bradley et al., 1996; Forman & McCauley, 1986; National Research Council, 2003). All 
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forms of the polygraph are susceptible to countermeasures such as intentionally causing 
pain or tensing muscles during truthful answering which can cause sufficient arousal to 
mimic the physiological responses to lies (Honts et al., 1985; National Research Council, 
2003). For all these reasons, the polygraph has fallen out of favor and there has been a 
call nationally for the development of alternative methods of lie detection (National 
Research Council). 
To provide further summary, several other methods of lie detection have been 
developed with varying degrees of success. One method of analyzing written transcripts 
of statements called CBCA (Pezdek et al., 2004). Other methods involving 
neuro-imaging such as fMRI scanning have demonstrated effectiveness for detecting lies 
in some cases, but are in need of much refinement and validation (Langleben et al., 2002; 
Lee et al., 2002; Spence et al., 2001). Moreover, they are presently too costly and 
impractical (Kozel et al., 2004). 
Brain imaging studies have shown that several areas of the brain are activated 
during lie detection, leading Walczyk et al. (2005) to propose that lying causes greater 
cognitive load than truth-telling which may reveal itself in signs of cognitive load. The 
ADCM, is a model that illustrates how lying can be a more demanding cognitive task 
than telling the truth (Walczyk et al., 2005). Studies testing the ADCM have shown that 
the cognitive load of lying significantly increases the response time to answer (Walczyk 
et al., 2009). Increasing the cognitive load on the liar, such as by asking unanticipated 
questions, also improves the accuracy of human lie detection by increasing frequency and 
intensity of cues that can be used to detect lies. However, cognitive lie detection 
techniques are still in the early stages of development (Vrij et al., 2008; Vrij et al., 2009). 
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As with other the methods of lie detection, more refinement is necessary to improve 
cognitive techniques before operational lie detectors can be achieved (Walczyk et al., 
2009). 
The Current Study 
Current lie detectors are too inaccurate to be relied upon (National Research 
Council, 2003). Because people are so inaccurate, and highly effective lie detection 
technologies have yet to be developed (DePaulo et al., 2003), it is important to 
understand how and when humans infer that another person is lying, irrespective of the 
accuracy of those inferences. Gender, an unreliable cue to deception (DePaulo et al.) may 
nonetheless have a large impact on the inference of lies. Understanding how gender 
might bias the inferences of lies can bring to light a factor irrelevant to deception that 
people rely on as a cue. Such knowledge can help clinicians and other professionals be 
more accurate lie detectors. 
Inferences are judgments that a statement is a "truth" or a "lie", regardless of 
accuracy. One goal of this study was to determine if the gender of a potential liar and that 
of a target influence the frequency of lie inferences. If factors that influence judgments of 
credibility also influence the inference of lies, it is expected that gender plays a crucial 
role in the inference of deception. The study directly tested the theory that women infer 
lies less frequently than men, because they are more accommodating (DePaulo et al., 
1985). The present research departs from previous research that has explored lie detection 
accuracy. The current study was designed to determine if gender influences targets and 
third party observers' inferences of lies, regardless of the accuracy of those inferences. 
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To study the influence of gender on the inference of lies, participants were 
exposed to one of four levels of a stimulus: audio-visual (target perspective), audio-visual 
(third-person perspective), audio only, and verbatim written transcript. The levels of the 
stimulus varied the amount and type of information that was available to third-party 
observers. If gender is a potent factor in the inferences of lies, it might, for instance, have 
its largest impact in the audio-visual third-person perspective. This design mimics that of 
DePaulo et al. (1985). The stimuli were developed from four interactions between dyads 
of confederates posing as an interviewer and an interviewee. Dyads were composed of all 
possible gender combinations of interviewer (sender) and interviewee (target): male-
male, male-female, female-male, and female-female. The sender adopted the role of an 
interviewee for a position at a competitive internship in psychology. The interviewee 
answered a series of 24 questions (see Appendix A) posed by the target. Interviewees 
were instructed to lie to half (12) of the questions. Participants (target/third-person 
evaluators) were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions and were exposed to all 
four sender-target dyads. They indicated on a questionnaire if they believed each of the 
interviewee's answers to be the truth or a lie as well as their confidence in each inference 
using a Likert scale. Participants also completed of gender-specific personality 
attributions and social desirability. Hypotheses and justifications are given below. 
Hypothesis 1 
Participants in the target condition will infer lies more often when the 
potential liar is of the opposite sex of the participant than when the potential liar is 
the same sex as the participant DePaulo et al. (1985) argued that lies told to a member 
of the opposite sex were more detectable than those told to someone of the same sex due 
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to a higher motivation to succeed, which involves more attempted control of behavior. It 
is possible that targets are more accurate when judging the lies of a member of the 
opposite sex simply because they infer lies more often. This will apply across conditions, 
even when non-verbal behaviors are not available as in the transcript condition. 
Hypothesis 2 
Participants in conditions having equal exposure to the potential liar and the 
target (all conditions except "target") will infer lies more often when they are the 
opposite sex of the potential liar than when they are the same sex as the potential 
liar. DePaulo et al. (1993) found that women were more accommodating in their 
interpretation of non-verbal cues to deception. In other words, they were more likely to 
give liars the "benefit of the doubt", but were less likely to accurately detect lies. 
Previous research has not directly addressed how the gender of the potential liar and the 
target influence the inferences of lies by third-person evaluators. This hypothesis 
examined inferences of lying from the perspective of an individual outside of the 
target/sender dyad. This hypothesis allowed examination of any changes in the tendency 
to infer lies based on the gender of the participant, the liar, and the target. This should 
apply across conditions, even in those in which non-verbal behaviors are not available. 
Hypothesis 3 
Male participants will infer lies more often than female participants in all 
conditions except in the transcript condition, when non-verbal cues are unavailable. 
DePaulo et al. (1985), DePaulo et al. (2003), and Rosenthal and DePaulo (1979) 
proposed that women are more accommodating than men in their interpretations of 
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possible nonverbal cues to deception. This is particularly true of non-verbal cues that are 
less controllable and of shorter duration. Women's positive interpretations of ambiguous 
cues may underlie their lower detection accuracy. In the present research, if women are 
more accommodating than men in their interpretation of non-verbal cues, they should 
infer lies less often than men. If the previous findings are accurate, males and females 
should infer lies with equal frequency when non-verbal cues are unavailable in the 
transcript-only condition. 
Hypothesis 4 
Among female participants, there will be a negative relationship between 
femininity and the number of lies inferred. DePaulo et al. (1985), DePaulo et al. 
(2003), and Rosenthal and De Paulo (1979) suggest that women are socialized to be more 
accommodating in their inferences of lies. If true, it is likely that females with higher 
scores on a scale of femininity will infer lies less frequently than those with lower scores. 
Females who, as adults, exhibit more feminine characteristics have likely received more 
reinforcement for more feminine behaviors including being accommodating of non­
verbal cues to deception. 
Hypothesis 5 
Among male participants, there will be a negative relationship between 
femininity and the number of lies inferred. DePaulo et al. (2003) and Rosenthal and 
DePaulo (1979) suggested that social learning processes reinforce women to become 
more accommodating in their interpretation of non-verbal cues, especially those relevant 
to deception. If social learning inculcates a tendency in females to be more 
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accommodating in their interpretation of non-verbal cues, it is a logical corollary that 
men who exhibit more feminine characteristics and behaviors will have similarly been 
reinforced through social learning to have been more accommodating of ambiguous 
social cues. 
Hypothesis 6 
Lies will be inferred less often when liars are female than when they are 
male. Dacy and Brodsky (1992) found that women received higher ratings of 
trustworthiness as therapists. Women's ratings were attributed, by these authors, to be the 
result of stereotypical gender roles inculcated in females to be caring and nurturing, 
giving them an advantage in trustworthiness. Unfortunately, the authors did not address 
the behavioral consequences of judgments of trustworthiness for instance, if they extend 
to inference of deception. Though it is possible that people do not consider these initial 
judgments of trustworthiness when inferring that another person is lying, it is 
hypothesized that people will infer lies according to their original judgments influenced 
by their assessments of trustworthiness. In other words, because women are considered 
more trustworthy than men in general, lies will be inferred more in women than men. 
This hypothesis applies across experimental conditions. 
CHAPTER TWO 
METHOD 
Participants 
A total of 309 participants were recruited for this study. The sample was made up 
of 103 males (33%) and 206 females (67%). The mean age of participants was 38.99 
years (SD = 16.05). Ages ranged from 18 to 77. By race the largest %age of participants 
was Caucasian (n = 208) (67.3%). Other ethnicities included African American (n = 87) 
(28.2%), Hispanic American (n = 5) (0.02%), Asian American (n= 1) (.003%), and those 
who self-classified as "other" (n - 8) (0.026%). Participants were drawn from a 
population of college students and a population of mental health professionals. The use of 
human participants was approved by the Human Use Committee at Louisiana Tech 
University (See Appendix B). 
Undergraduate and graduate level student participants were recruited from 
psychology classes at a medium-sized southern university (n = 119). Of student 
participants, 51 were male (42.9%) and 68 were female (57.1%). With regard to the 
academic classification of students, 48 were graduate students (40.3%) and 71 were 
undergraduates (51.7%). The mean age of the student participants was 24.85, with a 
range from 17 to 53 years of age. Students varied on academic major/concentration 
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Students were primarily Caucasian in ethnicity (n = 84). African Americans were the 
second most common ethnic group (n = 27); only one student identified him/herself as 
Hispanic American and one as Asian American. All other ethnic groups were described 
as "other" (n = 6). 
Participants were also recruited from a group of mental health professionals 
attending a professional seminar series for the purposes of continuing education (n = 190) 
as required for the maintenance of their licensure in Louisiana. Of these participants, 
there were 52 males (27.4%) and 138 females (72.6%). The mental health professionals' 
ages ranged from 24 to 77, with a mean age of 47.85 years. The most prevalent ethnicity 
of these participants was Caucasian as well (n = 124) (65%). Other ethnicities included 
African American (n = 60) (31.6%), Hispanic American (n = 4) (.02%) and those who 
self-identified as "other" (n = 2) (.01%). The size of the overall sample was large enough 
to accurately detect various effect sizes in the population. Cohen (1992) recommended a 
sample size of N = 63 for an ANOVA using four groups. Using a group of 309 should 
allow small to medium effect sizes to be detected (Cohen, 1992). 
At the time of recruitment, participants were randomly assigned a group number. 
Based on the number, the student participants were given a choice of several appointment 
times during which their experimental condition would be administered. For mental 
health professionals, the number indicated the seminar during which they would 
participate in the experimental procedures. All participants were exposed to one of the 
following four conditions. They were as follows: the target group (a) (n = 59) watched 
an audio-visual stimulus of an interview. In the target stimulus, the interviewee alone was 
visible to the participant. The third-person evaluator group (b) (« = 71) watched an audio­
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visual stimulus in which both parties were visible to the participant. The audio-only 
group (c) (n = 80) listened to the audio that was isolated from the video stimuli used in 
the previous two conditions. Finally, the transcript group (d) (n = 99) read a verbatim 
transcript that included all of the verbal data from the stimuli in the other conditions (see 
Table 1). Group sizes unequal because of the occasional inability of participants to 
complete the data collection procedure at the dates and times that were offered. 
Table 1 
Participants in Each Stimulus Condition 
Condition n  Male Female 
Target 59 27 32 
3 rd Person Observer 71 18 53 
Audio-only 80 23 57 
Transcript-only 99 34 64 
Total 309 103 206 
Instrumentation 
A group of doctoral students were recruited to participate as confederates (n = 6) 
who would assist in the creation of stimulus materials that would later be used during 
data collection. Half were males. They completed the same demographic questionnaire, 
as did the participants. The questionnaire is described later (see Appendix C). Each 
confederate either played the role of an interviewer (n = 2) or a sender (n = 4) in the 
creation of an audio-visual recording. Interviewers included one male and one female. 
Interviewees included two females and two males. Confederates were instructed to 
complete a short, videotaped interview during which they answered a series of questions 
either truthfully or deceptively. They were further instructed to appear as sincere as 
possible. Confederates were given a list of the 24 questions that would be asked. The 
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experimenter randomly chose which 12 of the questions all senders would answer 
deceptively and the other 12 that would be answered honestly. By having both male and 
female senders lie to the same set of questions, it was assured that gender was not a cue 
to deception After it was established that confederates accurately understood the 
instructions, they were allowed to take the list of questions home to prepare their 
answers. The videotaped interview occurred within 48 hours of the confederates 
receiving the materials from which to rehearse. A copy of the stimulus questionnaire 
(Appendix A) was provided to each interviewee (sender) when they arrived for their 
videotaped interview. On this form, they indicated those questions that were answered 
truthfully or with lies. In each case, interviewees followed instructions properly about 
which questions were to be lied to and which ones were to be answered honestly. They 
later wrote down truthful answers to each question so that the answers given during the 
interview could be checked against them to ensure questions that were to be answered 
deceptively and so forth. Interviewees followed directions properly in each case. 
Video Procedure 
The aforementioned group of confederates assisted in the creation of stimulus 
materials. Each confederate was videotaped answering 24 questions in an interview 
setting. Later, participants were randomly assigned to engage the stimuli in one of four 
conditions as described below. 
Condition A: "Target" Condition 
For the target condition, audio-visual recordings were made using a digital video 
camera, which was positioned so that only the interviewee was visible to the participants 
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(Appendix D, Camera 1). The digital video file was stored and edited on a MacBook 
Pro® laptop computer using iMovie® software. All videos were displayed using the same 
classroom video equipment for all student participants. Due to the size of the audience, a 
larger display was used for the group of mental health professionals. For the student 
group, the audio for all conditions was broadcast using a small portable speaker system. 
Condition B: "Third-Person Evaluator" Condition 
Each interview was simultaneously videotaped from another angle (Appendix D, 
Camera 2). A digital video camera, recording at the same video quality as that used for 
the condition A stimulus, was used to create the video for condition B. Camera two was 
positioned such that both the interviewer and the interviewee were equally visible in the 
shot. The seats were arranged so that more than just the profile of the interviewer and 
interviewee were visible in the frame. As pictured in Appendix D, the chairs were turned 
45 degrees in order to increase the visibility of both confederates. Digital video files were 
stored and edited on a MacBook Pro® laptop computer using iMovie® software. 
Condition C: Audio Only Condition 
The audio from the recordings was later stripped of the video using iMovie® 
software on a MacBook Pro® laptop computer. The audio files were the stimulus for 
participants in condition C. These recordings were thus the same as those for conditions 
A and B. All audios for audio/visual and audio only conditions were played through the 
same speaker system for all student participants. A different system was used for the 
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mental health participants due to the size of the audience. Using the same audio and 
delivery systems established as much consistency between the stimuli presentations as 
possible. 
Condition D: "Transcript Only" Condition 
Finally, a verbatim transcript was developed using Microsoft Word® word 
processing software. Specifically, the audio data were typed verbatim into a Microsoft 
Word document (.docx) and printed using 10-point font. The transcript included all 
utterances of confederates. Including non-word utterances such as "um", "uh", etc. 
allowed participants in the transcript condition to be presented with "as accurate as 
possible" representations of the audio data in the absence of sound. Each question asked 
in the interview was included in the transcript, along with the answers. The names that 
were used in labeling the source of the utterances made clear the gender of the speaker. 
Measures 
The following measures were administered to all participants. 
The Personal Attributes 
Questionnaire 
The Personal Attributes Questionnaire (Helmreich, Spence, & Wilhelm, 1981) 
(PAQ) is a 24-item instrument that measures the degree to which stereotypically 
masculine or feminine adjectives apply to the respondent. It is divided into three scales, 
"Instrumentality", "Expressivity", and "Androgyny". Items are designed such that 
participants must make a self-evaluation along the continuum between two poles. 
Instructions state that participants should "...choose a letter which describes where you 
fall on the scale." For instance, an item could read ''Not at all artistic A...B...C...D...E 
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Very Artistic' (Spence & Helmreich, 1978). All of the adjectives in the PAQ are 
considered desirable regardless of the gender of the person who possesses them. The 
complete scale appears in Appendix E. All 309 participants completed this measure. 
Thus, there were no missing data. 
High scores on the instrumentality scale suggest a "masculine" description applies 
to them. This scale consists of eight items to which respondents are asked to rate the 
degree to which they believe adjectives are self-descriptive. Stereotypically, men are 
thought to possess the traits of the adjectives on these items more frequently than women. 
Spence and Helmreich (1978) emphasized "self-assertiveness", as the most 
stereotypically masculine trait. 
The expressiveness scale, or Femininity scale, also includes eight items. 
Accordingly, respondents indicate the degree to which they believe adjectives 
characterize them. The adjectives on this scale describe characteristics that have been 
stereotypically possessed by women. All of these adjectives describe traits that are related 
to interpersonal interactions. 
The remaining eight items measure "androgyny". This scale is currently titled 
Masculinity-Femininity or M-F. Items on this contain mixed gender-related content. 
Respondents rate themselves on the adjectives "aggressive" and "dominant" on the M-F 
scale. These are considered the instrumental items. The remaining six items are 
suggestive of emotional vulnerability (Helmreich, Spence, & Wilhelm, 1981). 
For scoring purposes, point values ranging from one point to five points are 
assigned to each letter (A=l, B =2, etc.). The sum of the point values for items in each 
scale comprises the total score for that scale. Therefore, the scores in each scale can range 
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from 8 to 40. A score of 8 on the Masculinity scale indicates the lowest level of 
masculinity possible on the instrument, and so forth (Helmreich, Spence, & Wilhelm, 
1981). Participants' scores on the Femininity scale were used to test Hypothesis 4 (H4), 
which states that females with higher scores on a scale of femininity would infer lies less 
frequently than those with lower scores. They were also used to test Hypothesis 5 (H5), 
which states that males with higher scores on a scale of femininity will infer lies less 
frequently than those with lower scores. 
Estimates of internal consistency for the M scale range from a = 0.67 - 0.78. The 
F scale internal consistency estimates are better, ranging from a = 0.72 - 0.80. The range 
for the M-F scale is the lowest, yielding an internal consistency estimate range from a = 
0.53 - 0.62. Helmreich, Spence, and Wilhelm (1981) believe that the low internal 
consistency estimate of the latter are most likely due to the gender-mixed content of the 
M-F scale. 
For the current study, Chronbach's alpha was calculated as a measure of internal 
consistency for the scales of the PAQ. The analysis of the M scale led to an alpha 
estimate of a = .684. The F scale of the PAQ yielded a higher estimate of internal 
consistency for the current sample, a = .744. Finally, the A scale also yielded a internal 
consistency estimate of, a = .402. These results are comparable to those obtained by 
Helmreich et al. (1981). 
An independent samples /-test was used to evaluate any potential differences 
between students and mental health professionals on the scales of the PAQ. The analysis 
did not reveal any differences between the two groups of participants on the M scale, 
/(307) = 1.366, p = . 173, or on the F scale, /(307) = .703, p = .482, or the F scale, /(307) = 
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-.819,/? = .413. The results suggest that both groups of participants had similar scores on 
the scales of the PAQ. Students and mental health professionals were combined analyses 
involving the PAQ. 
One-sample /-tests were used to test for differences between the participants in 
this samples' scores on the scales of the PAQ and another comparative sample, 
specifically the group of 612 college students of Ward, Thorn, and Clements (2006). This 
comparison sample was chosen because of its size and the inclusion of college students. 
It is noteworthy, however, that the current study also included mental health 
professionals, each holding one or more graduate degrees. Males in the current study had 
significantly higher scores than males in the comparative sample /(102) = 13.463,/? = 
.000. Females in the current study also had significantly higher scores on the masculinity 
scale than their counterparts in the comparative sample /(205) = 29.831 ,/? = .000. Results 
were similar for the femininity scale. Males femininity scores were significantly higher 
than those from Ward, Thorn, and Clements (2006) /(102) = 21.487,/? = .000. Females 
femininity were also higher than those of the comparative sample /(205) = 23.849,/? = 
.000. Comparison of the current participants to the sample from Ward, Thorn, and 
Clements (2006) on the androgyny (M-F) scale of the PAQ yielded similar results. 
Males' androgyny scores were significantly higher than those of the comparative sample 
/(102) = 18.911,/? = .000. Female's androgyny scores from the current sample were also 
significantly higher than the comparison group /(205) 52.878,/? = .000. Means and 
standard deviations can be found in Table 2. 
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Table 2 
Means and Standard Deviations for PAQ Subscale Scores 
Current Study (n =309) Ward et al.. 2006 (n =612) 
Male Female Male Female 
Subscale M SD M SD M SD M SD 
PAQ masculinity 
PAQ femininity 
PAQ androgyny 
29.21 4.51 28.53 3.66 23.23 4.35 20.90 4.60 
30.43 3.71 31.68 4.04 22.58 4.17 24.97 3.77 
23.61 3.31 25.65 3.29 17.52 3.58 13.48 4.41 
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability 
Scale Short Form C 
Participants also completed the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale Short 
Form C (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) (see Appendix E). Using self-report items, this 
instrument measures the tendency to provide socially desirable responses. The authors 
designed this instrument such that high scores do not imply pathology of any kind. 
The abbreviated form used in this study, consisting of 13 true or false questions, 
was extracted from the original 33-item scale. The measure includes eight items 
describing positive behaviors that are infrequent in the general population, making the 
socially desirable response true. The remaining five items describe negative behaviors 
that are likely true in the general population, thus the socially desirable response is false. 
Short Form C has an internal consistency of 0.76, while correlating highly (r = 
0.93) with the full version of the inventory (Reynolds, 1982). Internal consistency 
estimates for the shortened questionnaire range from 0.62 to 0.96 (Ballard, 1992, Fischer 
& Fick, 1993; Loo & Thorpe, 2000; Zook & Sipps, 1985). For the current study, 
Chronbach's alpha was again used to determine the internal consistency of the 
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Marlowe-Crowne for the sample. A comparable estimate of internal consistency was 
found for the sample, a = .72. Because this estimate is within the range established by 
previous investigators, the data from the instrument was usable for analyses for this 
study. 
Investigators have proposed that women are more accommodating in their 
interpretation of non-verbal cues (Rosenthal & DePaulo, 1985). It is possible that those 
higher in social desirability, especially women, will infer lies less frequently. The scores 
from the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale were used to determine if there was 
a relationship between social desirability and the frequency of the inference of lies for 
exploratory purposes only. 
An independent samples /-test was used to uncover any group differences 
between student and mental health professional participants on the Marlowe-Crowne. 
The results show that the students (M= 4.53) (SD = 3.02) and mental health 
p r o f e s s i o n a l s  ( M  =  4 . 1 7 )  ( S D  =  3 . 4 6 )  d i d  n o t  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r  i n  s o c i a l  d e s i r a b i l i t y ,  t  
(307) = .935,/? = .350. Because scores were similar, on the Marlowe-Crowne and the 
PAQ, students and mental health professionals were combined for the analyses. 
A one-sample t-test was used to compare the scores on the Marlowe-Crowne for 
participants in the current study to those of a comparative sample. The sample used for 
comparison consisted of 429 university students (Zook & Sipps, 1985). This sample was 
chosen because of the comparable size and the inclusion of university students. Males' 
scores on the Marlow-Crowne were not significantly different than those of the 
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comparative sample /(102) = .296, p = .768. Similarly, females social desirability scores 
were not significantly different than those of the participants from Zook and Sipps (1985) 
/(205) = .925, p =.356. Means and standard deviations can be found in Table 3. 
Table 3 
Means and Standard Deviations for Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale 
Male Female 
Study M SD M SD 
Zook & Sipps, 1985 (n =429) 4.02 2.81 4.19 2.97 
Current Study (n = 309) 4.11 3.30 4.40 3.30 
Stimulus Questionnaire 
A stimulus questionnaire featuring the 24 questions that were asked during the 
interview is reproduced in Appendix A. Questions were asked in the same order they 
appear in the questionnaire. Space was provided for participants to indicate if they 
believed each answer to be the truth or a lie. Participants were also instructed to rate their 
confidence in each response on a 5-point Likert type scale ranging from 1 (not confident) 
to 5 (highly confident). 
Procedure 
As noted previously, participants were randomly assigned to one of four 
conditions. Participants gave informed consent before testing. They were then asked to 
complete a survey of demographic information (see Appendix C) that assessed 
participants' age, gender, race, major, relationship/marital status, and socioeconomic 
status for student participants. The demographic questionnaire was slightly altered for the 
mental health professionals. They indicated their age, gender, race, and occupational 
specialty. Also included in this packet was, first, the PAQ (Spence & Helmriech, 1978), 
followed by the Marlowe Crowne Social Desirability Scale Short Form C (Crowne & 
Marlowe, 1960). Each group was then given a brief introduction explaining that the 
interview took place for the purposes of intern selection, and that each interviewee was 
an applicant for a competitive internship program in psychology. This explanation was 
kept constant across experimental conditions. In each condition, questions and answers 
were presented in the same order to keep question order from being a possible confound. 
The presentations were approximately 15 minutes in duration to minimize the effects of 
fatigue. 
Condition A 
Participants in condition A (audio-visual target condition) were instructed to 
imagine that they were assistants to the interviewer who were to help assess the 
truthfulness of answers, and that they should do their best to determine if the interviewee 
told the truth or lied in response to each question. Finally, participants were asked to 
indicate their confidence in their judgment of the veracity of each answer on the stimulus 
questionnaire (see Appendix A). They were told that some of the answers were lies. They 
then watched the audio-visual recording from camera one while completing the stimulus 
questionnaire. Participants in this condition watched four videos with the following 
gender dyad orientations: 1) male interviewee - male interviewer, 2) male interviewee -
female interviewer, 3) female interviewee - male interviewer, 4) female interviewee -
female interviewer. The order was randomized to control for order effects in this and 
other conditions. Recall that each sender lied to the same predetermined questions. 
59 
Condition B 
Participants in condition B (audio-visual third-person observer condition) were 
instructed to evaluate the answers of the people being interviewed. Specifically, they 
were told that they should do their best to determine if the interviewee was telling the 
truth or lying in response to each question. Participants in this group also provided 
confidence ratings for each answer. They were told to imagine that their judgments would 
be used to corroborate the ratings of the interviewer in order to aid the selection process. 
They then watched the recordings made by camera two while completing the stimulus 
questionnaire. Recordings for condition B were made simultaneously with those from 
condition A, but from a different angle (see Appendix D). Camera two was positioned so 
that the interviewee and the interviewer were both visible in the frame. Audio was 
recorded from one source, and, thus, was identical to the audio used in condition A. This 
prevented any differences in the audio from providing cues to deception or otherwise 
confounding comparison with the other conditions that provided audio. Participants in 
this condition watched the same four videos with the following gender dyad orientations: 
1) male interviewee - male interviewer, 2) male interviewee - female interviewer, 3) 
female interviewee - male interviewer, 4) female interviewee - female interviewer. As in 
the previous condition, the interviewee lied to the same predetermined questions. 
Condition C 
Participants in condition C (audio only condition) were instructed to listen to the 
audio of the interviews and do their best to determine if the person being interviewed was 
telling the truth or lying in response to each question. Again, participants provided 
confidence ratings for each answer. They were asked to imagine that their decisions 
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would be used to corroborate those of the interviewer to aid in the selection process. They 
then heard the four audio recordings, without being exposed to the visual portion of the 
stimulus. The stimulus questionnaire was completed as they listened to the audio 
recording. As with the conditions A and B, participants in this condition heard audio with 
the following gender dyad orientations: 1) male interviewee - male interviewer, 2) male 
interviewee - female interviewer, 3) female interviewee - male interviewer, 4) female 
interviewee - female interviewer. 
Condition D 
These participants (transcript only condition) were provided a verbatim written 
transcript of the four interviews. They were instructed to read the transcripts of the four 
interviews and do their best to determine if the interviewee was telling the truth or lying 
in response to each question. As in the other conditions, these participants provided 
confidence ratings for each inference. They were also asked to imagine that their 
decisions would be used to corroborate those of the interviewer to aid in the selection 
process. Participants were presented with a transcript of the audio from Condition C with 
the following gender dyad orientations: 1) male interviewee - male interviewer, 2) male 
interviewee - female interviewer, 3) female interviewee - male interviewer, 4) female 
interviewee - female interviewer. Stereotypical masculine and feminine names were used 
in the transcript to allow participants to identify easily the gender of the interviewer and 
interviewee. Participants completed the questionnaire as they read the transcript. 
CHAPTER THREE 
RESULTS 
Overview of Analyses 
The experimental design of the present study was a mixed methods design. A 
between-subjects independent variable was the condition of the stimulus to which 
participants were exposed. This variable had four levels varying in the amount of 
information contained in the stimulus, (a) The third-person observer audio-visual 
condition (3rd person observer) contained the most information. Participants were 
exposed to the audio and visual recordings of both members of the interviewer-
interviewee dyad, (b) The target audio visual-condition (target) included the audio data 
from the interviewer and the audio and visual data from the interviewee, (c) The audio-
only condition included only the audio information from both interviewer and 
interviewee, (d) Finally, the transcript only condition only included a written transcript of 
the audio data, thus excluding non-verbal behaviors completely. The gender of the 
participant was also a between-subjects independent variable. Within-subjects 
independent variables included the genders of the target and of the interviewer-
interviewee dyads. Scores on the three scales of the PAQ and scores on the Marlowe-
Crowne Social Desirability Short Form - C were used as independent variables in 
correlational analyses. The dependent variables were the number of lies inferred and the 
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confidence in inferences of lies or truth. None of the hypotheses addressed the 
participants' confidence in their inferences of lies. These data were analyzed for 
exploratory purposes only. 
Analyses of these data required several statistical procedures. Hypotheses 1 and 2 
involved repeated measures ANOVAs. A one-way ANOVA was used to test hypothesis 
3. Pearson's correlations were also used to test for relationships required by hypotheses 4 
and 5. Finally, another repeated measures ANOVA was used to assess Hypothesis 6. 
One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to analyze participants' confidence 
ratings for each question. In the event of a significant main effect involving stimulus 
condition when the number of lies inferred or confidence ratings were the dependent 
variables, the Student Neumann Keul's post-hoc analysis was used to identify the groups 
that were significantly different. 
Hypothesis 1 
It was proposed that participants in the target condition would infer lies more 
frequently when the potential liar was of the opposite sex of the participant than when the 
potential liar and the participant were the same sex. A Repeated Measures Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) was used to test this hypothesis using SPSS® software. The between-
subjects independent variable was the gender of the participant. The within-subjects 
independent variable was the gender of the interviewee. The dependent variable was the 
number of lie inferences made by the participants. Because this hypothesis was meant to 
assess how potential targets would infer lies, only the participants in the target condition 
(n = 59) were included in this analysis. The target condition was the closest 
approximation of participants being in the position of a target of a lie. Mauchly's Test of 
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Sphericity was used to test the equivalence of variance patterns in the data. This test was 
not significant, W= 1, X2 = .000, p > .05. This result suggests that the data have 
approximately equal variances and that using an uncorrected Repeated Measures 
ANOVA is appropriate for this analysis. A main effect was discovered for the gender of 
the sender F(\, 57) = 6.298,p = .015, partial t] - .100. This finding suggests that lies were 
inferred more frequently in the target condition when senders were female (M = 12.220) 
(SD = 5.795) than when they were male (M = 10.848) (SD = 4.909). In order to support 
Hypothesis 1, the analysis should have revealed a significant interaction between the 
gender of the interviewee/sender and that of the participant. No interaction effects were 
observed between the gender of the liar and the gender of the participant, F(1,57) = 
1.167, p — .285, partial r| = .020. Thus, the data do not support Hypothesis 1. Relevant 
summary statistics can be found in Table 5. Analysis results can be found in Table 4. 
These results suggest that the manipulation of the gender of the liar and the gender of the 
participant do not significantly affect the number of lies inferred by participants who had 
visual exposure to only the potential liar. 
Table 4 
Means and Standard Deviations of Number of Inferred Lies in the Target Condition 
Gender of participant 
Male (n=21) Female (n=32) total (n=59) 
Gender of Liar M SD M SD M SD 
Male 10.926 4.843 10.781 5.040 10.848 4.909 
Female 12.741 5.913 11.781 5.746 12.220 5.795 
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Table 5 
Analysis of Variance for Number of Lies Inferred by Each Group 
Source df F r| p 
Between subjects 
Gender of Liar 1 6.298 .100 .015* 
Liar gender x participant gender 1 1.167 .009 .471 
Within-group error 57 (9.211) 
Within subjects 
Participant gender 1 .181 .003 .672 
Within-group error 57 (49.209) 
Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors. 
*= p < .05 
Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 states that participants in conditions with equal exposure to the 
potential liar and the target would infer lies more often when they were the opposite sex 
of the potential liar than when participants and potential liars were the same sex. A 
repeated measures ANOVA was used to test this hypothesis. The between-subjects 
independent variables were the gender of the participant and the condition of the 
stimulus. The within subjects independent variable was the gender of the interviewee. 
Given the hypothesis, participants' data in the third-person evaluator group, the audio-
only group, and the transcript-only group were used for this analysis. This hypothesis 
concerns how participants would infer lies as observers rather than as targets. In the third-
person observer, audio, and transcript conditions, participants were exposed to the same 
amount of information from both the interviewers and the interviewees in the stimuli. For 
example, in the third-person evaluator group, participants were exposed to audio/visual 
recordings of both confederates in each dyad. The participants had audio/visual data from 
the interviewee and audio only for the interviewer in the target condition. 
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A total of 250 participants was included. The dependent variable was the number 
of lie inferences made by the participants. Mauchly's Test of Sphericity was used to 
ensure that variances within the data were approximately equivalent. The test result was 
not significant, W = 1.00, X = .000, p > .05. This indicates that no corrections are 
necessary to the results of the Repeated Measures ANOVA. The gender of the 
interviewee did not produce a main effect, F( 1, 244) = .394, /? = .531, partial r|2 = .002 
(see tables 6 and 7). The results show that participants in the three conditions were not 
more likely to infer lies due to the gender of the liar. No significant interaction was found 
between the independent variables, gender of the liar and gender of the participant, F( 1, 
•j 244) = 1.907, p = . 169, partial r| = .008 (see Table 6 for relevant summary statistics and 
Table 7 for analysis results). No interaction was found between the gender of the liar and 
-y 
the group, F(2,244) = .695, p = .500 partial r\ = .006. The means and standard deviations 
for lie inferences in each condition included in this analysis appear in Table 6. The 
interaction effects between gender of the interviewee and the gender of the participant 
were crucial for the support of hypothesis. No significant interaction was found. Thus, the 
data do not support Hypothesis 2. 
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Table 6 
Means and Standard Deviations for Inferred Lies in All Conditions Except "Target" 
Gender of participant 
m a l e (n = 76) f e m a l e (n = 174) total (n = 250) 
Gender of liar/condition M SD M SD M SD 
Male 
Female 
3rd Person 12.167 5.305 15.566 7.042 14.704 11.092 
Audio Only 13.870 5.379 13.298 6.026 13.462 5.820 
Transcript Only 13.057 5.450 14.188 7.042 13.788 6.517 
Total 13.092 5.360 14.316 8.761 13.944 7.893 
3 rd Person 12.222 6.103 13.377 6.543 13.085 6.411 
Audio Only 13.826 6.213 12.474 6.077 12.863 6.108 
Transcript Only 14.286 7.213 13.891 6.759 14.030 6.889 
Total 13.658 6.636 13.270 6.467 13.388 6.508 
Table 7 
Analysis of Variance for Inferred Lies in All Conditions Except "Target" 
Source 
Gender of Liar 
Liar gender x participant gender 
Liar gender x group 
Liar gender x participant gender x group 
Within-group error 
Between subjects 
df F P 
1 .394 .002 .531 
1 1.907 .008 .165 
2 .695 .006 .500 
2 .132 .001 .877 
244 (30.221) 
Within subjects 
Participant gender 1 .420 .002 .517 
Group 2 .174 .001 .840 
Participant gender x group 2 1.035 .008 .357 
Within-group error 244 (75.050) 
Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors. 
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Hypothesis 3 
It was hypothesized that male participants would infer lies more often than female 
participants in all conditions except in the transcript condition, where non-verbal cues 
were unavailable. A multivariate ANOVA was used to compare the mean number of lies 
inferred by male and female participants. See Table 8 for relevant means and standard 
deviations. There was no significant main effect for stimulus condition F(3, 301) = .347, 
p = .772, partial r\ = .004. This result shows that participants in all groups inferred lies 
with approximately the same frequency. Neither was a significant main effect found for 
the gender of the participant, F(l, 301) = .023, p = .881, partial rj2 = .000. This suggests 
that participant gender did not significantly influence the frequency of inferred lies. No 
interaction was found between participant gender and group, F(3, 301) = 1.223,/? = .301, 
partial r\ = .012 (See Table 9 for relevant analysis results). This suggests that, regardless 
of group, participants of both genders inferred approximately the same number of lies. 
The results do not support hypothesis 3. 
Means and Standard Deviations for Number of Inferred Lies by Gender per Condition 
Table 8 
Gender of participant 
Male Female 
Condition N M SD N M SD 
Audio Only 
"Target" 
3rd Person Video 
Transcript Only 
Grand Mean 
23 28.652 12.452 57 25.597 11.263 
27 26.963 17.279 32 23.719 11.082 
18 24.222 9.873 53 28.736 14.587 
35 27.086 10.815 64 27.922 12.483 
103 26.903 12.913 206 27.835 12.573 
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Table 9 
Analysis of Variance for Number of Inferred Lies by Gender per Condition 
Source df F r\ p 
Between subjects 
Condition 3 .374 .004 .772 
Participant gender 1 .023 .000 .881 
Condition x participant gender 3 1.223 .012 .301 
Error 301 (161.293) 
Hypothesis 4 
It was proposed that a negative relationship would be found between female 
participants' femininity scores and the number of lies inferred. A Pearson correlation was 
used to test this hypothesis. Female participants' (N = 206) total number of inferred lies 
was correlated with their scores on the PAQ femininity scale. Scores from participants in 
all conditions were included in this analysis. Means and standard deviations for PAQ 
subscale scores are found in Table 10 by gender. There was no significant relationship 
found between femininity scores and the frequency of inferred lies, r(204) = -.046, p = 
.510. These results do not support hypothesis 4. 
Table 10 
Means and Standard Deviations for PAQ Subscale Scores 
Gender of Participant 
Male Female Total 
Subscale M SD M SD M SD 
PAQ masculinity 28.69 3.86 28.63 4.09 28.65 4.01 
PAQ femininity 30.51 3.68 32.31 6.20 31.70 5.54 
PAQ androgyny 23.61 3.29 25.89 4.29 25.12 4.12 
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Pearson correlations were also used to determine if any relationship exists 
between females' scores on the other scales of the PAQ. No significant relationship was 
found between females' scores on the PAQ masculinity scale, r{204) = .004,/? = .958, or 
the PAQ androgyny scale r(307) = -.008, p = .905. 
Hypothesis 5 
It was predicted that a negative correlation would be observed between male 
participants' femininity score and the total number of lies inferred. The hope was to 
determine if a feminine style of attribution in males was related to less frequent 
inferences of lies. To test this male participants' total number of lie inferences was 
associated with their scores on the femininity subscale of the PAQ using a Pearson 
correlation. Results did not reveal a significant relationship between femininity scores on 
the PAQ and the frequency of inference of lies, r(102) - -.032, p = .738. Thus, femininity 
scores of males were not related to the number of lies inferred by the participants. 
Hypothesis 5 was not supported. 
Pearson correlations were also used to explore the data for relationships between 
the frequencies of lie inferences and other PAQ scale scores for males. No significant 
relationship was found between males' scores on the PAQ masculinity scales and total 
number of lie inferences, r( 101) = -.002, p = .987, or on the PAQ androgyny scale, r(101) 
= -.086, p — .386. 
Hypothesis 6 
Hypothesis 6 stated that lies would be inferred less often when liars were female. 
This hypothesis was tested using repeated-measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). 
The within-subjects factor was the gender of the liar. The between subjects factor was the 
condition of the stimulus to which each participant was exposed (Audio, Target, Third-
Person, Transcript). The dependent variable was the total number of lie inferences. All 
309 participants were included in this analysis. Relevant descriptive statistics are 
presented in Table 11. 
Table 11 
Means and Standard Deviations for Number of Inferred Lies per Group 
Gender of Liar 
Male Female 
Condition M SD M SD 
Audio 13.463 5.820 12.863 6.108 
Target 10.847 4.901 12.220 5.793 
Third Person 14.704 11.092 12.084 6.411 
Transcript 14.188 7.042 14.030 6.889 
Grand Mean 13.353 8.383 13.165 6.385 
Mauchly's Test of Sphericity was again used to ensure that variances within the 
data were approximately equivalent. The test result was not significant, W = 1.00, X = 
.000, p > .01. This result indicates that no corrections are needed to the results of the 
Repeated Measures ANOVA. The analysis did not reveal a significant main effect for the 
gender of the liar F(l, 301) = .043, p = .836, partial .000. No interaction was found 
'j between the gender of the participant, F( 1, 301) = 2.12, p - . 138, partial tj = .007, or 
between gender of the liar and condition, F(3, 301) = 1.293 ,p = 211, partial rj2= .013. 
Neither was an interaction found between the gender of the liar, gender of the participant, 
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and condition, F(3, 301) = .133,/? = .940, partial tj2= .001. These results suggest that 
none of the variables in question or combinations thereof influence the frequency of lie 
inferences. Hypothesis 6 is not supported because no significant main effect was found 
for the gender of the liar. A summary of results is presented in Table 12. 
Table 12 
Analysis of Variance for Number of Lies Inferred by Participants of Each Gender/Group 
Source df F x\ p 
Between subjects 
Gender of liar 1 .043 .000 .836 
Gender of liar x participant gender 1 2.212 .007 .138 
Gender of liar x condition 3 1.293 .013 .277 
Gender of liar x participant gender x condition 3 .133 .001 .940 
Within-group error 301 (26.242) 
Within subjects 
Participant gender 1 .147 .000 .702 
Condition 3 1.885 .018 .132 
Within-group error 301 (70.157) 
Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors. 
*=p < .05 
Exploratory Analyses 
For exploratory purposes, recall that all participants completed the Marlowe-
Crowne Social Desirability Scale. Though none of the hypotheses addressed social 
desirability, these data are now analyzed. The first goal was to determine if male and 
female participants' social desirability scores were significantly different using an 
independent samples Mest. The independent variable for this analysis was the gender of 
the participant. The dependent variable was the score on the Marlowe-Crowne. There 
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were no significant differences between male and female participants' scores on the 
Marlowe-Crowne, /(307)= . 177, p = .859. Another goal was to determine if any 
significant relationships exist between the number of inferred lies and social desirability. 
This analysis did not reveal a significant Pearson correlation between social desirability 
and total inferences of lies for all participants, r(307) = -.016,p = .773. Similarly, males' 
scores on the Marlowe-Crowne were not related to the number of lie inferences, r( 101) = 
-.023, p = .820. The same was found for females' scores, r(204) = -.130,/? = .851. These 
results suggest that social desirability is not related to the inference of lies for either 
gender. 
As participants completed the stimulus questionnaire, they indicated their 
confidence in each inference of truth or lie. Ratings were provided on a 5-point Likert-
type scale ranging from 1, not confident, to 5, highly confident. To explore these data, 
confidence ratings for each question were analyzed for all 96 ratings (24 questions x 4 
within-subject conditions). Using one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), the 
condition of the stimulus to which each participant was exposed was used as the 
independent variable. Confidence ratings for each question were used as the dependent 
variable; there was at total of 96 ANOVAs. Due to the large number of analyses, a 
Bonferonni correction was used to reduce the risk of committing a type one error. Only 
three significant models were found when using this correction. They are listed in Table 
13. Without the correction, a pattern of higher confidence ratings was noticeable. 
Because this analysis is exploratory, the uncorrected results are also included. Significant 
models indicated that the stimulus condition significantly influenced confidence ratings 
overall (see Tables 14-17). Those means that are significantly different are also reported. 
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Table 13 
Questions with Significantly Different Means (Bonferonni Correction) 
Stimulus Condition 
3rd Person Target Audio Transcript 
Ql/male (t) 
female(s) 3.93 .930 3.29 .812 3.60 1.061 3.95 .962 1-2, 2-4 
Q4/male (t) 
male(s) 3.79 .958 4.34 .958 3.53 .993 3.87 .888 2-3 
Q13/male (t) 
male(s) 4.07 .884 4.39 .983 3.65 1.145 3.99 .909 2-3 
Mean # 
Table 14 
Questions with Significantly Different Means (Male Target-Female Sender) 
Stimulus Condition 
3rd Person Target Audio Transcript 
Questions M SD M SD M SD M SD Means Significantly Different 
01 3.91 .949 3.66 .958 3.51 .967 3.89 .803 1-3,3-4 
Q2 4.13 .899 4.46 .837 3.89 1.020 4.38 .724 1-3,3-4 
Q5 3.51 1.050 3.61 .929 3.19 1.060 3.63 1.060 1-3,3-4 
Q6 3.95 .962 3.29 .892 3.60 1.060 3.93 .931 1-3,3-4 
Q16 3.76 .991 3.34 1.080 3.83 1.080 3.82 1.020 1-2,2-3,2-4 
Q18 3.89 1.050 4.27 .980 3.73 1.080 3.85 1.010 1-2,2-3,2-4 
Q19 3.80 .990 4.29 1.000 3.70 1.010 3.80 .965 1-2,2-3,2-4 
Q23 3.85 .952 4.22 .930 3.86 1.050 3.75 1.070 1-2 
Mean # 1 2 3 4 
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Table 15 
Questions with Significantly Different Group Means (Female Target-Male Sender) 
Stimulus Condition 
3rd Person Target Audio Transcript 
Questions M SD M SD M SD M SD Means Significantly Different 
Ql 4.11 .856 4.53 .796 3.98 1.010 4.11 .854 1-2, 2-3, 2-4 
Q6 3.82 .952 3.41 1.100 3.49 1.020 3.89 .903 1-2, 1-3, 
2-4, 3-4 
Q7 4.12 .884 4.47 .817 3.95 1.070 4.23 .796 1-3, 1-4, 
2-3, 2-4 
Ql 1 3.62 .923 3.15 1.130 3.51 1.020 3.68 1.030 1-2, 2-3,2-4 
Q17 4.04 .957 4.37 .981 3.79 1.100 4.04 .818 1-3,2-3 
Q19 3.91 .905 4.25 .993 3.81 .982 3.85 .995 1-2, 2-3,2-4 
Mean # 
Table 16 
Questions with Significantly Different Means (Female Target-Female Sender) 
Stimulus Condition 
3rd Person Target Audio Transcript 
Questions M SD M SD M SD M SD Means Significantly Different 
Ql 3.80 892 3.61 1.450 3.61 1.060 4.13 .860 1-2, 1-3, 1-4 
Q2 3.63 1.020 4.17 1.090 3.44 1.130 3.63 .975 1-2, 2-3,2-4 
Q4 3.87 .888 4.34 .958 3.53 .993 3.79 .827 1-2, 2-3, 2-4 
Q9 3.77 .946 4.29 1.000 3.90 1.030 3.99 .837 1-3, 1-4, 2-4 
Q10 3.74 1.020 3.93 1.080 3.46 1.040 3.96 .818 1-3, 2-3 
Q13 3.99 .909 4.39 .983 3.55 1.140 4.07 .884 1-2, 1-3,2-3,2-4,3-4 
Q19 3.72 .959 4.22 1.040 3.74 1.000 3.73 .985 1-2, 2-3, 2-4 
M e a n  # 1  2  3  4  
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Table 17 
Questions with Significantly Different Means (Male Target-Male Sender) 
Stimulus Condition 
3rd Person Target Audio Transcript 
Questions M SD M SD M SD M SD Means Significantly Different 
Q19 3.60 1.12 4.12 1.00 3.70 1.13 3.79 1.080 2-4 
Q21 3.68 1.05 3.63 1.03 3.33 1.11 3.79 .954 1-3 
Q24 3.73 1.01 4.17 1.05 3.73 1.02 3.93 1.020 2-3, 2-4 
M e a n  # 1  2  3  4  
A total of 63 significant differences were found between conditions on confidence 
ratings for individual questions on the stimulus questionnaire. The results suggest that 
participants in the audio-visual conditions (3rd person evaluator and target conditions) 
were more confident that participants in the audio-only and transcript-only conditions. Of 
the significant differences, participants in the third-person evaluator group and the target 
group gave significantly higher confidence ratings 49 times (77.8%). Higher ratings were 
more common for the target group, which yielded 33 (52.3%) significantly higher ratings. 
Interestingly, nine (14%) means had significantly higher confidence ratings for 
participants in the target group than those in the third-person evaluator group. Only four 
(6%) of the differences were due to higher ratings by participants in the third-person 
evaluator group than those in the target group. Another result of interest was that 12 
(19%) of the differences involved higher ratings by participants in the transcript-only 
group than other groups. Most notably, six questions (9.5%) were rated higher by 
participants in the transcript-only condition than those in the audio-only condition. None 
of the questions in the audio-only condition had significantly higher confidence ratings 
than those in the transcript-only condition. 
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Overall, among the significantly different mean confidence ratings, participants in 
the audio/visual conditions usually had higher confidence than those in the other two 
conditions (Audio-Only, Transcript-Only). There were 28 total significant differences 
found between the audio-visual conditions and "non audio-visual" conditions. Of these, 
participants' confidence ratings were higher for 22 (78.6%) questions in audio-visual 
conditions compared to higher ratings for six (21.4%) questions in the non audio-visual 
conditions. This pattern suggests that participants were more confident when they had 
access to more information. This pattern was not found among questions in transcript and 
audio-only conditions. In fact, there were six differences between the two non audio­
visual conditions. In all six cases, participants were more confident in their inferences for 
the question in the transcript condition. These findings suggest that participants were 
most confident when they were able to use both audio and visual data. However, when 
the visual data was not available, participants were more confident in the transcript 
condition. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
DISCUSSION 
A preponderance of the existing research on deception is concerned with factors 
that influence one's ability to accurately detect lies (DePaulo et al., 2003). However, the 
evidence clearly indicates that human beings have approximately chance-level lie 
detection accuracy (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Ekman, 2001). Accepting this, the focus of 
the present research was on the possibly biasing role that gender can play on the 
inferences of lies in others. Below, the major findings are interpreted according to 
hypothesis. 
To summarize, DePaulo et al. (1985), DePaulo et al. (2003), and Rosenthal and 
DePaulo (1979) have speculated about how factors such as gender influence lie detection. 
The goal of the present research was to how gender influences how inferences of lies are 
formed. This study, unfortunately, provides little evidence to support a gender bias or 
"opposite sex bias". Moreover, the results do not show that a feminine style of 
accommodation influences how often lies are inferred. There were no identifiable 
differences between male and female participants on any of the analyses, regardless of 
the condition of the stimulus to which they were exposed. Consequently, it seems that the 
manipulation of the amount of information presented to participants had little or no 
impact on how often they inferred lies. 
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The only significant finding a result that was not hypothesized. It was found that, 
as targets, participants inferred more lies in females than in males. This is 
counterintuitive when considering the evidence that women commonly receive higher 
ratings of trustworthiness and credibility than men (Boccaccini & Brodsky, 2002; Dacy 
& Brodsky, 1992; Porter et al., 2008). 
Hypothesis 1 
The research of DePaulo et al. (1985) suggests that when dyads consist of 
opposite sex individuals, the target is more accurate in detecting lies. However, these 
authors did not evaluate how often participants inferred lies. Rather than evaluating the 
accuracy of lie detection, this study was designed to test for a possible gender bias that 
influences the frequency with which lies are inferred in a study in which male and female 
senders lied equally often (50% of the time). Because of the nature of the stimulus 
materials, it was impossible to have each participant have the experience of actually 
being the target of a potential lie. To address this, a condition was created in which 
participants watched an audio/visual stimulus that showed only the person being 
interviewed. Of course, participants were still exposed to the interviewer via the audio 
content. In the present research no evidence was found of the predicted interaction 
between the gender of the sender and the gender of the target. Participants in the current 
study inferred lies with approximately the same frequency, both when senders and 
participants were the same sex and when senders and participants were of the opposite 
sex. The gender of the potential liar alone also did not significantly influence the 
frequency of inferred lies. 
The study by DePaulo et al. (1985) addressed the ability of targets to detect lies 
when the potential liar was the opposite sex. Hypothesis 1 essentially proposed that 
participants would be more likely to infer lies when senders were the opposite sex. It is 
possible that lie detectors in DePaulo et al. (1985) actually inferred lies more frequently 
in members of the opposite sex, thereby, increasing their accuracy in detecting lies. For 
this study, the participants in the target condition were not significantly biased by the fact 
that the potential liar was of the opposite sex. Targets in this study apparently did not 
expect to be lied to more frequently when the sender is of the opposite sex. If targets did 
expect lies more often, it is logical that they would infer lies more frequently. 
Interestingly, as targets, participants were more likely to infer lies when senders 
were female. This is curious considering the evidence that females are frequently given 
higher ratings of credibility than men (Dacy & Brodsky, 1992). It is possible that, due to 
ongoing societal changes, women are losing the credibility that they once enjoyed. It is 
also possible that other characteristics of the female senders influenced the inference of 
lies. They were not pre-matched for trustworthiness or credibility, an oversight that 
should be corrected in future research. 
Hypothesis 2 
DePaulo et al. (1985) suggested that, when targets and senders are of the opposite 
sex, targets are more accurate lie detectors and would thus likely infer lies more often. 
The present test of Hypothesis 2 differed from that of hypothesis 1 in that data from the 
other three conditions (3rd Person Evaluator, Audio-Only, Transcript-Only) were used. 
Participants in these conditions had equal exposure to both the sender and the actual 
target of the lie. Under these conditions, it was proposed that participants would infer 
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more lies when they and the potential liar were opposite in sex than when they were the 
same sex. To review the three included stimulus conditions in greater detail, the 
conditions included the third-person evaluator condition in which participants watched 
the audio/visual recording of the stimulus interviews, the audio-only condition, in which 
participants heard only the audio from the stimulus interviews, and the transcript-only 
condition, in which participants were given a written transcript of the stimulus interviews. 
The data analysis yielded a similar result as the first hypothesis. Even when participants 
had equal access to both the potential target of a lie and the sender of a potential lie, there 
was no interaction of the gender of the liar and the gender of the participant. Participants 
inferred lies with approximately the same frequency when senders were the same sex as 
when they were the opposite sex of the participant. 
Interestingly, no main effect was identified for the gender of the sender. Only in 
the target condition was it found that lies were inferred more often in females. These 
findings suggest that the participants behaved differently as targets than in other 
conditions. Because this effect was not found in the other three conditions, it may be that 
the participants felt that female senders lied to them more often than they lied to the 
interviewer in the other conditions because of their roles as targets. Of course, it is 
possible that these results were swayed due to other factors. For example, in the 
conditions in which participants had equal exposure to the sender and the interviewer, 
characteristics of the interviewer may have influenced lie inferences. It may have been 
that the mere "presence" of the interviewer reduced the "burden" on the participants to 
identify lies. Clearly more research is needed to understand fully how gender interacts 
with the role of the observer to influence the inference of lies. 
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Hypothesis 3 
DePaulo et al. (1985), DePaulo et al. (2003), and Rosenthal and DePaulo (1979) 
proposed that women are more accommodating of non-verbal behaviors, especially those 
that are more common during lying. In this study, it was hypothesized that women would 
infer lies less frequently than men, due to being more accommodating of non-verbal cues 
during ambiguous cases in which lying may have occurred. Sadly, no significant gender 
differences were found between the mean numbers of lie inferences across conditions. 
That is to say, across all stimulus conditions, male and female participants inferred lies 
with approximately the same frequency. Furthermore, when the total number of lies was 
summed across all of the conditions in which participants had access to non-verbal 
information (target, third-person observer, audio-only), no significant difference was 
found between the mean number of lies inferred by female participants and male 
participants. In the transcript condition as with the other conditions, there was no 
evidence that women inferred lies significantly less than men. 
Participants in this study were exposed to stimulus materials varying in the 
amount of information participants had access to in liar-target interactions. DePaulo et al. 
(1985) found that women were generally more accurate in interpreting non-verbal cues. 
However, women's non-verbal detection skills decreased when cues came from non­
verbal channels that were more difficult to control and were shorter in duration, as cues 
might be during lying. The researchers speculated that women learned to accommodate 
non-verbal cues to lying. The goal of Hypothesis 3 was to test whether this 
"accommodating" style extends to inferences of lies. Essentially, the present results 
showed that women made the same number of negative attributions (lie inferences) as 
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men. However, it was not possible to determine if participants were using non-verbal 
behaviors as a basis of gender bias for making lie inferences. The procedures of this study 
are different from those that have been used to investigate female accommodation 
(DePaulo et al., 1985; DePaulo et al., 2003; Rosenthal & DePaulo, 1979). The current 
study was not designed to evaluate how participants interpreted non-verbal cues, or any 
other common cue to lying. Therefore, these findings do not contradict the findings of 
previous studies because the basis for lie inferences was not assessed. The broad aim was 
to identify the influence of gender on the inference of lies, regardless of the behavioral 
basis or the accuracy of the inferences. Rather than casting doubt on previous findings, 
the current study provide possible insight into what similar studies would find were they 
conducted more at present. Since the studies by DePaulo and colleagues of the late 1970s 
and 1980s, females may be less accommodating of nonverbal behaviors as their roles in 
society have expanded. 
Hypothesis 4 
DePaulo et al. (1985) and Rosenthal and DePaulo (1979) have suggested that 
women learn an accommodating style of non-verbal cue interpretation through normal 
processes of socialization. This implies that a feminine style of attribution could help 
account for variation in the inferences of lies. To test this, participants in this study 
completed the Personality Attributes Questionnaire (Helmreich, Spence, & Wilhelm, 
1981), which assessed the degree to which participants applied stereotypically masculine 
and/or feminine descriptors to themselves. If being "more accommodating" of non-verbal 
cues is typical of being more feminine, then higher scores on the femininity scale of the 
PAQ should have correlated with the number of lies inferred. The number of lies inferred 
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by females was not significantly correlated with femininity or other scales of the PAQ. 
This suggests that, even if the accommodation of non-verbal cues to lying is a socialized 
component of femininity, it may be very subtle such that it does not impact the frequency 
of lie inferences. These findings seem to contradict the implication of DePaulo et al. 
(1985) and Rosenthal and DePaulo (1979) that women are socialized to give others the 
benefit of a doubt in their interpretations of ambiguous non-verbal behaviors. On the 
other hand, as noted above, the roles of women may have changed and expanded in 
society over the past few decades such that they are less accommodating. 
Hypothesis 5 
Hypothesis 5 stated that among male participants, there would be a negative 
correlation between femininity and the number of lies inferred. As with Hypothesis 4, 
this hypothesis was aimed at testing how femininity is correlated with inference of lies, 
but in males. As noted above, previous researchers have suggested the females are 
socialized to be more accommodating of the cues to lying (DePaulo et al., 1985; DePaulo 
et al., 2003; Rosenthal & DePaulo, 1979). In an analogous way, males who endorsed 
more traditionally feminine attributes might also have learned to be more accommodating 
of the ambiguous cues to deception. If they were more accommodating, they might also 
be expected to infer lies less frequently than those with lower femininity scores. Contrary 
to Hypothesis 5, there were no significant correlations between femininity or any other 
PAQ subscales and the frequency of inferences of lies. It is possible for both males and 
females that femininity is not a key factor in the inferences of lies. Perhaps nonverbal 
cues such as gaze aversion play a greater role (DePaulo et al., 2003) 
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Hypothesis 6 
The final hypothesis was a test of a corollary, in a context involving deception, of 
Dacy and Brodsky's (1992) findings that women were rated as more trustworthy than 
men. It is certainly socially valuable to know if women receive higher trustworthiness 
ratings than men generally. Lie inferences are a logical behavioral consequence of such 
judgments. It was proposed that lies would be inferred more frequently when senders 
were male. This hypothesis was not supported. Participants in this study inferred lies 
equally often, regardless of the gender of the potential liar. This finding seems to suggest 
that ratings of trustworthiness are not behaviorally manifested in the form of gender 
biased lie inferences. However trustworthiness of the sender was not actually measured in 
this study. Future research should redress this oversight. 
Exploratory Analyses 
Participants also completed the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability scale for 
exploratory purposes. The instrument measures the degree to which people act in a 
socially desirable manner (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960; Zook & Sipps, 1985). Researchers 
have proposed that women are socialized to be more accommodating, such as not 
inferring lies based on ambiguous non-verbal cues. Rather they learned to give others the 
benefit of a doubt (Rosenthal & DePaulo, 1979; DePaulo et al., 1985). Though no studies 
have addressed the role of social desirability in the inferences of lies, the previous 
findings suggest that such factors might be influential. For the current study, males' and 
females' scores on this measure were not significantly different. Moreover, the analyses 
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did not reveal significant correlations between scores for either gender on the Marlowe-
Crowne and the frequency of lie inferences. This factor can be disregarded in future 
research. 
The exploratory analyses involving confidence ratings, when the alpha level was 
corrected, showed no pattern of significantly higher confidence ratings for any of the 
experimental conditions. However, without this correction, a pattern did emerge. The 
analyses revealed that participants were generally more confident in their inferences in 
the audio-visual conditions. In these conditions, participants had access to both verbal 
and non-verbal cues for detecting deception. The finding that participants in the target 
condition gave significantly higher confidence ratings on several questions than 
participants in the third-person evaluator condition implies that behaviors of the 
interviewer might reduce participants' confidence. Though the results of the ANOVA are 
not significant without the correction, it is a logical pattern in the participants' confidence 
ratings. The simplest explanation for these results generally is that participants had access 
to more information; namely the non-verbal behavior of both the interviewer and the 
interviewee. Because they were considering more information, the task became more 
difficult and resulted in lower ratings of confidence. Essentially, participants had to 
multitask. It is also noteworthy that the instructions given to participants in the target 
condition were slightly different that those given to participants in other conditions, 
creating a potential confound. Participants in the target condition were asked to imagine 
that the interviewee was talking directly to them. These participants alone were 
evaluating the veracity of the interviewee's answers. In other conditions, participants 
were asked to "help the interviewer" determine if the participant was telling the truth. As 
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to the practical importance of confidence ratings for lie detection purposes DePaulo et al. 
(2003) and Garrido, Masip. and Herrero (2004) found that confidence and accuracy are 
not related. 
It is logical that more information leads to more confidence, which seems to be 
the basis of higher confidence ratings in the target and third-person evaluator conditions. 
Interestingly, participants were more confident in the target condition, which is more 
representative of typical interpersonal interactions. Of course, these analyses are not 
simply indicative of confidence in inferences of lies, but of confidence in inferences of 
truth as well. Understanding factors that lead to more confidence can be useful in many 
ways. For example, researchers might apply such findings in future studies of credibility 
and trustworthiness. This study did not analyze deeply the factors that influenced 
confidence ratings. Because of design limitations, future research should also examine 
how confidence ratings relate to lie detection accuracy and what other factors influence 
ratings 
Limitations and Research Suggestions 
Several limitations of this research are noteworthy. Participants of this study, 
though diverse, are not representative of the general population. For instance, 
undergraduate and graduate students, as well as mental health professionals, all of whom 
had obtained a graduate degree to obtain licensure, have received more education than 
members of the general population. Gender bias may not be as strong among the better 
educated. Fischer and Good (1994) and Bavishi, Madera and Hebl, (2010) have 
investigated the presence of gender bias in universities and noted that discrimination is 
still evident in many forms among students in institutions of higher education, but it is 
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often subtle. Obtaining a sample of people with less education and from other 
professional backgrounds could provide more evidence of gender bias in the inference of 
lies. Such investigation could advance understanding of how professionals in a variety of 
fields are vulnerable to gender-biased lie inferences. 
It is also possible that the motivation of the present participants to detect lies 
influences the frequency of lie inferences. DePaulo et al. (2003) found that poorly 
motivated observers detect few lies and poorly motivated senders give up few reliable 
cues to deception. DePaulo et al. (1985) showed that as liars are increasingly motivated to 
succeed at lying, lie detectors are more successful at detecting their lies. It is reasonable 
to assume that altering the motivation of lie detectors to detect lies might also influence 
not only their accuracy at lie detection, but also the frequency with which they infer lies. 
To test this, future researchers may divide participants into groups with various levels of 
incentive for accurate lie detection. For example, one group could receive $10 for 
attaining a certain level of accuracy, another group no reward, etc. Anderson and Butzin 
(1979) proposed that motivation increases performance (Performance = Motivation x 
Ability), a theory that is foundational to industrial/organizational psychology. Based on 
this premise, it can be predicted that the higher the motivation of observers, the greater 
their attention to cues will be, resulting in greater inferences of lies and hopefully greater 
accuracy as well. 
In the present study, it was not possible to identify confidence ratings in 
inferences of lies separately from those of inferences of truths. It would be interesting and 
helpful to understand if confidence in lie inferences are influenced by different factors 
than those that influence confidence in truth inferences. However, other studies have 
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shown that higher confidence is not associated with accuracy, generally (Garrido et al., 
2004; Masip, Garrido, & Herrero, 2004). Future research should seek to identify the 
factors affecting confidence ratings in inferences of lies and truth and how accuracy can 
be improved. 
Several decades have passed between the time of many of the studies on 
credibility that are reviewed here were conducted and the present. It is possible that 
society's gender biases have lessened over the years. The sample might also be less 
vulnerable to the biases that were being studied. The sample used for this study was 
composed of college students and college graduates. Though there is evidence of 
prejudice in those who have received higher education, they may be less pronounced than 
in the general population (Fischer & Good, 1994). 
The present experimental situation may have lacked ecological validity. It is 
uncommon for people to be asked to evaluate the veracity of statements presented to 
them in a recording or in a transcript. Because participants were asked to do a task 
involving an unnatural situation, it is likely that results were thereby influenced. It could 
be that participants would behave differently if the situation were more like a "real life" 
interaction, or they had even more exposure to potential liars (e.g., if the interview was 
taking place in the same room as the participants). It is possible that if the participants 
could have had more "contact" with the sender, that biases would have been affected. 
Making modifications to increase the "realism" of the situation would certainly provide 
results that could be more easily generalized. 
In regard to how gender-related attribution style was assessed, it is possible that 
the PAQ did not directly measure the factors of femininity that are related to social 
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accommodation. The Bern Sex Role Inventory (Bern, 1974) (BSRI), for example, uses a 
different method for plotting masculinity and femininity along continuums. However, the 
scales of the PAQ and the BSRI provide such similar outcomes that they have been 
described as "interchangeable" (Lubinski, Tellegen, & Butcher, 1983). Still, use of the 
BSRI in future research might produce results confirmatory of Hypothesis 4 and 5 
because the BEM is longer and more comprehensive. 
Additional Areas for Future Research 
Deception research, as a field of study, has for some time examined human 
beings' accuracy at lie detection (DePaulo et al., 2003). At this time, even as many 
methods have been proposed, it will be beneficial to the understand of what cues people 
use to infer that other people are lying, and how biases might cause judgment errors 
(National Research Council, 2003). By identifying biases, researchers can conceivably 
teach human lie detectors how to control for them. DePaulo et al. found that misleading 
cues such as signs of nervousness and gaze aversion. Less research has focused on how 
gender, race, age or other demographics affect disciplines such as law, education, 
psychology and politics, to name a few. To the extent that these cues are misleading, 
professionals can be taught to overlook them as faulty cues to deception. 
It is likely that many biases are associated with the inference that a lie is taking 
place. Dacy and Brodsky (1992) and Porter et al. (2008) provide evidence that 
attractiveness, attire, professional background, and qualifications; among others influence 
judgments of credibility and trustworthiness. Porter et al. showed that trustworthiness 
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judgments are made very quickly. Consequently, it is likely that any readily observable 
factor about the individual being judged could influence inferences of lies. This is an 
exciting area of investigation available to interested researchers. 
Personality type of the target or evaluator could be among the factors that impact 
the inferences of lies. The Big Five personality measures of the NEO-Personality 
Inventory (NEO PI) (Costa & McCrae, 1985) might provide valuable data that leads to a 
broader understanding of how lying inferences are formed. The NEO PI measures factors 
such as "Neuroticism" of which "vulnerability" is a facet. Individuals with high scores in 
vulnerability often feel helpless and emotionally out of control (Weiner & Greene, 2008). 
People who feel helpless might be less likely to infer lies. Conversely, they might feel 
that others are more likely to be dishonest, and infer lies more frequently. "Extraversion" 
is also a potentially important factor in the NEO PI. High scorers in extraversion prefer 
social interactions, and are often dominant and assertive in their social groups (Weiner & 
Greene). As lie detectors, high scorers may be more attuned to the behaviors of the liars, 
as they are more frequently engaged in social interactions. Thus, they might interpret 
non-verbal behaviors more accurately to detect lies. As liars, they might be more gifted 
by virtue of their frequent social interaction. Agreeableness is perhaps the personality 
factor that would be most influential in lie inferences. "Trust" is one component of 
agreeableness (Weiner & Greene). Individuals with high scores on this scale believe that 
people are generally trustworthy (Weiner & Greene). It is logical to postulate that those 
with high scores on trust will be less likely to infer lies. Low scorers tend to be distrustful 
of others, and believe that most people have self-serving motivations, even when they 
seem altruistic. Therefore, it could be inferred that low scorers would be more likely to 
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infer lies (Weiner & Greene). Though the aforementioned scales seem to be the most 
likely to influence inferences of lies, other personality dimensions may do so as well. 
This area of research is wide open. 
An important goal of lying research has been to improve the accuracy of human 
lie detection (Bond et al., 1992; DePaulo et al., 2003; DePaulo et al., 1985; Frank & 
Ekman, 2004; Rosenthal & DePaulo, 1979; Vrij et al., 2008; Vrij et al., 2009). Although 
Garrido et al. (2004) showed that confidence and accuracy are not strongly related, future 
research could further investigate factors that influence confidence and accurate lie 
detection concurrently. Such information could inform future efforts to train human lie 
detectors. To study this, researchers could do a more in-depth investigation into what 
information increases confidence in lie inferences. For example, specific behaviors or 
physical characteristics of senders or personality factors of senders, targets, and observers 
may influence confidence in lie inferences and their accuracy (Bond & DePaulo). By 
identifying biases and their impacts, researchers might develop training modules for 
police, therapists, and others to make explicit these sources of inaccuracy. Improved 
human lie detection would result. 
Studying biases using methods such as those in this study are important in several 
areas other than lie detection. Credibility researchers could use information to identify 
more factors that influence credibility and its components. Psychologists can also use the 
information from this study and other such studies to increase their credibility and 
manage their biases. Doing so would be beneficial for improving the therapeutic 
relationship and maximizing psychologists' efficacy in other areas of practice for 
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forensics, training, and supervision. By isolating factors that influence biases and testing 
them in the most realistic settings, future research can positively impact many areas of 
society. 
APPENDIX A 
STIMULUS QUESTIONNAIRE 
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Stimulus Questionnaire 
Each of the individuals responding to these questions is an applicant for a competitive internship in psychology. The following 
questions are regarding their education, legal, and personal background. Internship directors and staff use these questions along 
with other information provided by the applicant to determine how well the applicant will "fit in" with the staff. 
Please indicate if you believe the applicant was telling the truth or lying to each question listed below. Do not leave any blank. 
In the space provided to the right of your response, please indicate your confidence in the response you chose on a scale from I 
not confident to 5 very confident. Circle the number that best represents your confidence in your response. 
Truth Lie 
1. Do you always wear your seatbelt when you drive? 
2. What year did you receive your GED or 
graduate from high school? 
3. Have you ever been convicted of a felony? 
4. In what state were you born? 
5. What was your high school GPA? 
6. Do you wear sunscreen when you 
are exposed to excessive sunlight? 
7. Do you use your cellphone while driving? 
8. Have you ever attempted to forge a check 
or tax document? 
9. Have you ever used an illegal drug 
10. What do you currently do for work? 
11. Have you ever failed to pay back a loan? 
12 Are you currently being sued? 
13. Have you ever lied in order to get a job? 
14. Do you smoke cigarettes? 
15. Has anyone ever bribed you? 
16. Have you ever tried to bribe someone? 
17. Have you had any traffic violations in the 
last three years? 
18. Have you ever been fired from a job? 
19 Have you ever abused prescription medication? 
20 Have you ever cheated to win a game or contest? 
21. Have you ever lied to your boss? 
22. If we offered, would you be willing to take less 
money to do your job for our company? 
23. Are you currently employed? 
24. Do you have any disability recognized by the 
university? 
not confident 1. 2. . .3 . 4 .5 very confident 
not confident 1 .. .2 . 3. . 4 . .5 very confident 
not confident 1. 2 .3. . 4 . .5 very confident 
not confident 1...2...3...4...5 very confident 
not confident 1 ...2...3...4...5 very confident 
not confident 1 ...2. ..3...4.. .5 very confident 
not confident 1 ...2. . 3...4...5 very confident 
not confident 1 . ..2. . .3. . .4 . .5 very confident 
not confident 1 ...2...3...4 . .5 very confident 
not confident 1...2. ..3. . .4. ..5 very confident 
not confident 1 ...2...3...4...5 very confident 
not confident 1...2...3. .4. . 5 very confident 
not confident 1 . . .2. . .3. . .4 . 5 very confident 
not confident 1 ...2...3 . .4...5 very confident 
not confident 1...2...3...4...5 very confident 
not confident 1...2...3...4...5 very confident 
not confident 1 . ..2. .3 . 4 . .5 very confident 
not confident 1 . . .2 . 3. . 4. . . 5 very confident 
not confident 1. ..2...3...4...5 very confident 
not confident 1, 2...3...4...5 very confident 
not confident 1 ...2...3...4. .5 very confident 
not confident 1 . . . 2 . . . 3...4...5 very confident 
not confident I . ..2. . .3. . .4.. 5 very confident 
not confident 1. . .2. . .3. . .4...5 very confident 
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I  i !  S  I A  N  A  !  L O i  
s /  !  R  S  i  t  
MEMORANDUM 
IO: Mr. Byron Simoneaux and Dr. Jcffcry Walczyk 
FROM: Barbara Talbot, University Research 
SUBJHCT: HUMAN USK COMMITTEE REVIEW 
DATE June 21, 2011 
In order to facilitate your project, an EXPEDITED REVIEW has been done for your proposed 
study ent i t led:  
"Effects of Gender Composition of Target and Sender Dyads on the 
Tendency to Infer Lies and Deception Detection" 
The proposed study's revised procedures were found to provide reasonable and adequate 
safeguards against possible risks involving human subjects. The information to be collected may 
be personal in nature or implication. Therefore, diligent care needs to be taken to protect the 
privacy of the participants and to assure that the data are kept confidential. Informed conscnt is a 
critical part of the research process. The subjects must be informed that their participation is 
voluntary. It is important that consent materials be presented in a language understandable to 
every participant. If you have participants in your study whose first language is not English, be 
sure that informed conscnt materials are adequately explained or translated. Since your reviewed 
project appears to do no damage to the participants, the Human Use Committee grants approval 
of the involvement of human subjects as outlined. 
Projects should be renewed annually. This approval was finalized on June 21, 2011 and this 
project will need to receive a continuation review by the 1RB if the project, including data 
analysis, continues beyond June 21, 2012. Any discrepancies in procedure or changes that have 
been made including approved changes should be noted in the review application. Projects 
involving NIH funds require annual education training to be documented. For more information 
regarding this, contact the Office of University Research. 
You arc requested to maintain written records of your procedures, data collected, and subjects 
involved. These records will need to be available upon request during the conduct of the study 
and retained by the university for three years after the conclusion of the study. If changes occur 
in rccruiting of subjects, informed consent process or in your research protocol, or if 
unanticipated problems should arise it is the Researchers responsibility to notify the Office of 
Research or IRB in writing. The project should be discontinued until modifications can be 
reviewed and approved. 
If you have any questions, please contact Dr. Mary Livingston at 257-4315. 
IIL'C 867 (Revision) 
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Age: 
Gender: 
1. Male 
2. Female 
Major: 
Classification: 
1. Freshman 
2. Sophomore 
3. Junior 
4. Senior 
Ethnicity: 
1. African American 
2. Asian American 
3. Caucasian 
4. Hispanic 
5. Other 
Marital Status 
1. Divorced 
2. Married 
3. Single 
4. Widowed 
5. Other 
College GPA: 
1.4.0-3.0 
2. 2.9-2.0 
3. 1.9-1.0 
4. 0.9-0.0 
5. N/A 
Average Annual Income 
l.Over $200,000 
2. $100,000- $200,000 
3. $50,000-$100,000 
4. $25,000 - $50,000 
5. Below $25,000 
Enrollment Status 
1. Part-time 
2. Full Time 
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• (. amera! Interviewer 
Camera - v .m r^ In!cn *cvv cc 
Anows indieaie ihe direction each person races 
Shaded triangles indicate the uewinn area <>l each eamera 
Figure 1 Camera Positions 
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Personal Attributes Questionnaire 
The items below inquire about what kind of person you think you are. Euch items consists of a pair of 
characteristics, with the letters A-E in between. For example: 
Not at all Artistic A B C D E Very Artistic 
Each pair describes contradictory characteristics—that is. you cannot be both at the same time, such as very 
artistic and not at all artistic. 
The letters form a scale between the two extremes. You arc to choose a letter which describes where you fall on 
the scale. For example, if you think you have no artistic ability, you would choose A. If you think you are pretty 
good, you might choose D. If you arc only medium, you might choose C. and so forth. 
A B c D E 
I. Not at all aggressive o o o o o Very aggressive 
2 Not at all Independent o o o o o Very independent 
3. Not at all emotional o o o o o Very emotional 
4. Very submissisve o o o o o Very dominant 
5. Not at all excitable in a major crisis o o o o o Very excitable in a major crisis 
6. Very passive o o o o o Very active 
7. Not at all able to devote 
self completely to others o o o o o 
Able to devote self 
completely to others 
8. Very rough o o o o o Very gentle 
9. Not at all helpful to others o o o o o Very helpful to others 
10. Not at all competitive o o o o o Very competitive 
11. Very home oriented o o o o o Very worldly 
12. Not at all kind o o o o o Very kind 
13. Indifferent to others approval o o o o o Highly needful of others approval 
14. Feelings not easily hurt o o o o o Feelings easily hurt 
15. Not at all aware of 
feelings of others o o o o o 
Very aware of feelings 
of others 
16. Can make decisions easily o o o o o Has difficulty making decisions 
17. Gives up very easily o o o o o Never gives up easily 
18. Never cries o o o o o Cries very easily 
19. Not at all self-conlldent o o o o o Very self-confident 
20. Feels very inferior o o o o o Feels superior 
21. Not at all understanding 
of others o o o o o 
Very understanding of 
others 
22. Very cold in relations with others o o o o o Very warm in relations with others 
23. Very little time for security o o o o o Very strong need for security 
24. Goes to picces under pressure o o o o o Stands up well under pressure 
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Read each of the following items and decide whether the statement is true or false as it 
pertains to you personally and mark T or F in the blank beside the statement to indicate 
this. 
1.1 sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way. 
2. On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because I thought 
too little of my ability. 
3. There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in 
authority even thought I knew they were right. 
4. No matter who I'm talking to, I'm always a good listener. 
5.1 can remember "playing sick" to get out of something. 
6. There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone. 
7. I'm always willing to admit it when I make a mistake. 
8.1 sometimes try to get even, rather than forgive and forget. 
9.1 am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable. 
10.1 have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different 
from my own. 
11. There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortunes 
of others. 
12.1 am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me. 
13.1 have never deliberately said something that hurt someone's feelings. 
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